Responses to "What to Do in Iraq: A Roundtable"

Web Exclusive (posted July 17, 2006)

by Larry Diamond

Larry Diamond, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, is the author of Squandered Victory: The American Occupation and the Bungled Effort to Bring Democracy to Iraq.

I have these few quick thoughts on this worthwhile and provocative symposium:

I wish Christopher Hitchens would move beyond justifying the intervention in Iraq (just as others need to move beyond condemning it) to grapple with the issue of what should actually be done now. If U.S. forces have to stay until they have revived Iraq's industrial infrastructure and inflicted a "battlefield defeat" on al Qaeda and the Baathists, they should plan on being there for a couple of decades. As for his being open to the division of Iraq, such a division would not end the violence, just intensify it as all groups struggle over the spoils north, south and center.

I agree with Fred Kaplan that the weakest points in Leslie Gelb's proposal are figuring out how the Sunnis can be guaranteed a fair share of oil revenues in perpetuity and how a weak central government can impose (or frankly even negotiate) a solution on the current conflict. I also agree with Kaplan (and James Dobbins) that Washington should lower its sights at this point, aiming, for example, for stabilization rather than democratization. (We held a conference on that very theme at Stanford a couple of months ago; the report from it can be found here.)

I agree with Chaim Kaufmann to a limited extent on the value of helping to relocate people and defend refugees, and even perhaps quietly, wearily, resigning ourselves to further ethnic separation. But I don't think the United States should promote or morally condone such an outcome—which will not, in any case, stabilize Iraq, just (at best) reduce some of the bloodshed.

I don't think that Iraq is in a "low-grade ... civil war," as Kevin Drum writes. At the current rate of killings, the annual civilian death toll is now 20,000. This is no longer "low intensity." I do agree with Drum that the United States needs to find a "prudent and sensible way" to leave Iraq, but I don't think he actually offers one.

I think Marc Lynch is dead right about the spoiler problem. And I sympathize with his first post's lack of a bold conclusion. For some time now, and with growing urgency and poignancy, I have had a sinking feeling that the situation is headed for disaster no matter what Washington does at this point. If the United States pulls out fast, there will be all-out, horrific, regionally spreading civil war. If it stays indefinitely, it will incur more casualties, run through an additional $8 billion per month, grind down the American military machine, and help al Qaeda's recruitment efforts—all simply to watch Iraq burn slowly rather than quickly. If Washington tries to separate the country amicably into autonomous regions or statelets, those new units will start fighting over the distribution of oil and power, so the incipient civil war will intensify. If it tries to hold the country together, the civil war will also intensify.

Given all this, my guess is that the Bush administration will continue to stare into the approaching abyss like a deer in the headlights, frozen in its current stance. It will try to withdraw some troops before November to show progress, but will not be able to withdraw too many so long as it remains in office because that would likely trigger an all-out civil war. So the mess will likely end up being passed on to the next administration.

It is hard for me to remember a time when I have felt that the United States was so hopelessly, brutally, and thoroughly trapped in a thankless policy. However, since despair is not a policy option, we are compelled to continue the search for practical options.

Having read both the full Roundtable in the print edition of the magazine and the first round of posts in this online exchange, I still think my proposal makes the most sense—even though I'm not particularly optimistic that it will be tried, or executed well if it were, or that it would necessarily solve the problems at hand.

On reflection, I think my appeal (and Dobbins') for a new, intensified, and more broadly regional effort at diplomatic mediation could converge in an interesting way with elements of what Gelb suggests. Gelb's proposal could be adapted to provide not for one Shiite region in the south but three. This would still devolve power substantially, but it would be a more balanced federation (six regions, each composed of three provinces) and thus less objectionable to the Sunnis than a single (hegemonic) Shiite super-region. It would also be much less likely to lead to the further polarization and possible break-up of the country, as it would create a more fluid and complex federal system, activating the cleavages among the Shiites and making it likely that different Shiite political forces would control different provinces. (Such a modified regional system would also diminish the potential sway of Iran over the new political order in the south).

As Gelb himself emphasizes, any such federal system would have to give clear and full control over the country's oil and gas resources to the central government. I also think his federalist proposal would be more viable and acceptable if it created some kind of automatic and internationally guaranteed payment mechanism for transferring the statutory shares of Iraq's oil and gas revenues directly to the regional governments.

Broadened regional diplomacy to foster consensus around some such a federalist, power-and-revenue-sharing approach seems the least hopeless option at this point. But it would need to be combined with new efforts to negotiate with Sunni insurgent elements, and continued efforts to confront and diminish the murderous sectarian militias and to build up some semblance of a genuinely Iraqi state and army.

It seems very likely that large numbers of American troops (probably at least 100,000) will remain in Iraq through 2008. Then, if the Iraqis haven't made major progress in constructing a state apparatus, army, and police that can hold the country together, Washington will—and should—start heading for the exit while trying to contain the regional repercussions. What should be conveyed pointedly to the Iraqi government now, and to the parties that look to the United States for stabilization, is that they should not consider the American presence open-ended, and had better start assuming more responsibility for forging political consensus and a viable state.