Life after Arafat

Nov. 10 2004 -- In the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Palestinian political scientist Khalil Shikaki asserted that holding Palestinian national elections was the only way to bring stability and governmental accountability to Gaza and the West Bank. In a follow-up email interview, Dr. Shikaki discusses what the future will hold for the Palestinians, elections, and the prospects of peace in the Middle East, now that Yasir Arafat is gone.

Khalil Shikaki is Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

With Arafat effectively out of the picture, what kind of leadership will likely take his place?

The succession process is likely to be relatively smooth in the short run, with the emergence of a transitional leadership of old guard members including Mahmoud Abbas and Ahmad Qurei. But in the long run, the old guard has little chance of remaining in power unless it forges a coalition with young guard nationalists, organizes national elections, and receives significant help from Israel and the United States. If any of these do not happen, the future leadership will most likely be shaped by young guards and Islamists.

It now appears that all the Palestinian factions are trying to maintain a show of unity. How long will this last?

Since this is a period of grief, no one wants to be seen as acting alone and thus jeopardizing the future of the Palestinians. All say they are for consultation and collective leadership. But all realize that such a leadership would be a recipe for paralysis, and soon all but a few will demand national elections.

Are elections more likely now — and are they more likely to result in an accountable, effective Palestinian government?

Without Arafat, the transitional government will soon lose legitimacy. Only by promising elections soon can the old guard reinvigorate the political system and begin to break out of its paralysis. The old guard needs to hold immediate elections within the nationalist Fatah party and make arrangements for holding national elections in the next few months.

But before holding elections, old guard leaders would have to forge an immediate coalition with the young guard to prevent Islamists such as Hamas from taking advantage of nationalist fragmentation. Such a nationalist coalition would be possible if Israel releases young guard leader Marwan Barghouti from jail. With Barghouti sharing power with Abbas and Qurei, the nationalists would have a chance after elections to form a coalition government with independents, while the Islamists will represent a strong opposition.

However, some in Israel and in the Bush administration may be inclined to think that, with Arafat gone and moderates such as Abbas and Qurei in place, elections should not be risked--fearing that the old guard would be weakened, young guard militants would be empowered, and Islamists would be given a strong voice in Palestinian politics. But the reality is that all of these things are guaranteed to happen if elections do not take place.

A positive elections outcome requires Israel and the United States to play a supportive role. In addition to releasing Barghouti, Israel must halt its current inflammatory practices, such as the assassination of Palestinian militants and incursions into Palestinian territory. Israel must also demonstrate its willingness to immediately enter into serious negotiations with old guard leaders, rather than waiting for them to break from Arafat's legacy.

For its part, Washington needs to outline a more engaged policy, including a detailed vision of a two-state solution and a permanent settlement. It is time for the Bush administration to pay attention to issues such as settlement build-up, the separation wall, check points, and restrictions on Palestinian movement. Without a change in Washington regarding these matters, the United States — and the Palestinians who work with it — will continue to lack credibility in the Palestinian street. High-level U.S. engagement will be critical to demonstrate the Bush administration's seriousness about reaching a just peace.

How will Arafat's death affect Israel's plan to disengage from Gaza?

In the best-case scenario, Israel would find a negotiating partner in the Palestinian transitional leadership. With a ceasefire in place, Palestinian national elections, and young guard-old guard unity, Israel could implement its plan in full coordination with the PA. In the worst-case scenario, challenges from young guard members and Islamists would paralyze the Palestinian transitional leadership, leading to a significant rise in internal violence and violence against Israelis. In this case, the disengagement could turn into an Israeli retreat under fire, with a tremendous loss of Palestinian life.

Many in Israel and the United States have long blamed Arafat for the failure of the peace process. Will a new Palestinian leadership be more flexible and willing to strike a deal?

Palestinians have a completely different narrative with regard to Arafat's negotiating position. They view him as tough but a pragmatist, not an ideologue; a man committed to a two-state solution. In the short term, the transitional leadership will be more willing than Arafat to implement the Quartet's "road map," but it will lack the capacity to implement Palestinian security commitments. But elections, old guard-young guard unity, and Israeli and U.S. cooperation, would give the old guard transitional leadership the opportunity and enough legitimacy to begin negotiations soon, even before elections. In this scenario, a Palestinian ceasefire can be accomplished fairly quickly.