Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East

F. Stephen Larrabee

From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007

Summary:  In a departure from its traditional foreign policy, Turkey is now becoming an important player in the Middle East. Turkey's growing concern over Kurdish nationalism has brought Ankara closer to the governments of Iran and Syria, which also contend with restive Kurds at home. Although troubling, this shift could be an opportunity for Washington and its allies to use Turkey as a bridge to the Middle East.

F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Corporate Chair in European Security at the RAND Corporation.

The Turkish military, however, opposes such a dialogue: it claims that the two leading Kurdish groups in Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party, headed by Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, headed by Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, are supporting the pkk militarily and materially. Given the importance of the military in Turkish politics, especially on sensitive issues of national security, the government will need its support -- or at least its acquiescence -- if any dialogue with the Iraqi Kurds is to succeed.

While the Turkish military may exaggerate the degree of support the pkk receives from the Iraqi Kurdish leaders, the latter have not been sufficiently aggressive in cracking down on the pkk. Whether this is because Iraqi Kurds see the pkk as a bargaining chip to be traded later for concessions on Kirkuk or because they fear opposition from younger, more radical Kurdish leaders is unclear. What is clear is that a tougher policy toward the pkk is a sine qua non for easing tensions between the Iraqi Kurdish leadership and Turkey.

The United States needs to play a more active role in helping defuse tensions between Ankara and the Iraqi Kurdish leadership. The appointment last September of Joseph Ralston, a retired air force general and former nato supreme allied commander for Europe, as the special envoy responsible for coordinating efforts against the pkk was a step in the right direction. But his mission has produced few concrete results. As a consequence, the Erdogan government has come under growing pressure from the Turkish military to take unilateral military action against the pkk -- a move that would be highly destabilizing and could lead to a broadening of the conflict in Iraq.

At the same time, recent tensions between the Erdogan government and the Turkish military over the selection of a new Turkish president have threatened the country's own stability and made it all the more urgent for the United States to get involved. Washington needs to press the Iraqi Kurdish leadership harder, particularly the regional government of Kurdistan, to crack down on pkk activities and close down pkk training camps. It should insist that the Iraqi Kurdish authorities arrest pkk leaders -- many of whom roam freely in northern Iraq and even appear on government-controlled television stations -- and turn them over to the Turkish government. Such a move would have an enormous impact on public opinion in Turkey and significantly reduce the growing anti-American sentiment there.

The United States should also encourage the Turkish government to address more forthrightly the grievances of the Kurds in Turkey. Ankara's actions should include a comprehensive effort to promote the economic development of southeastern Turkey, one of the poorest and least developed parts of the country and a prime source of recruitment for the pkk, especially among younger Kurds. One useful measure would be to open up the Turkish political system to greater participation by Kurdish groups in parliament. Most Turkish Kurds do not agree with the pkk's goals or methods, but they feel it is the only group that stands up for their interests. If Kurdish groups were given a greater opportunity to openly represent these interests in parliament, sympathy for the pkk among Kurds in Turkey would drop.

Finally, U.S. policymakers need to pay more attention to Turkey's other security concerns, including the strategic implications of Iran's nuclear ambitions. The prospect that Iran may obtain nuclear weapons is likely to heighten Turkey's interest in missile defense. Yet, current plans for deploying elements of a U.S. missile defense system in Poland and the Czech Republic are designed to provide protection against only long-range missile threats from Iran and North Korea, and they exclude southern Europe and Turkey, effectively dividing Europe into two unequal zones of security. This is bound to reinforce Turkey's sense of insecurity and its disenchantment with its Western allies since it already faces a threat from Iran's short- and medium-range systems, some of which can reach parts of eastern Turkey. The United States needs to develop a short- and medium-range missile defense system -- perhaps through the deployment of Patriot systems -- that can protect Turkey and the rest of southern Europe. Otherwise, current plans could exacerbate Turkey's security concerns and create new strains in Washington's relations with Ankara.

Taken together, these steps would demonstrate that the United States is serious about addressing Turkey's key security concerns, and they could provide the building blocks for developing a meaningful strategic partnership with Ankara. Time is running out, however. Unless Washington quickly takes more resolute steps to address these issues, U.S.-Turkish relations are likely to deteriorate further, and the United States will lose a significant opportunity to enhance stability in a region that is becoming vital to its own security.¶