A False Choice in Pakistan

Daniel Markey

From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007

Summary:  Americans are increasingly frustrated with Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts, but the United States should resist the urge to threaten President Pervez Musharraf or demand a quick democratic transition. Getting Islamabad to play a more effective role in the war on terrorism will require that Washington strike a careful balance: pushing for political reform but without jeopardizing the military's core interests.

Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations, served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from 2003 to 2007.

But over the past two years, particularly as the Pakistani army's heavyhanded occupation of the FATA began to alienate local Pashtun tribes, shifting alliances between the government and domestic militants have made the battle lines more ambiguous. A series of assassinations of moderate tribal elders and signs of creeping "Talibanization" in the settled areas neighboring the FATA raised fears in Islamabad that the militant tide had risen too far. In response, last spring Musharraf shifted to a new policy in the FATA, drawing on a counterinsurgency model by incorporating generous development assistance, political overtures, and a redeployment of the army away from population centers.

On the Afghan side of the border, intensified military operations in the spring and summer of 2006 convinced U.S. and NATO troops that a considerable number of militants had been able to find sanctuary in Pakistan, that prominent Afghan Taliban leaders were managing to plan operations from Pakistan, and that Pakistani border units lacked the will or the capacity to cut off cross-border infiltration. Under these conditions, it is unsurprising that Islamabad's announcement of a new, comprehensive approach to the FATA was greeted with some skepticism in Washington.

In the weeks after the new approach was made official, U.S. and international security force officials reportedly claimed that cross-border attacks were up by 300 percent. Even if these reports were accurate, an initial spike in infiltration should not have been viewed as proof of Pakistan's duplicity or of flaws in its long-term strategy. The infiltration spike was, at least in part, an opportunistic move by militants, capitalizing on the turmoil associated with the army's redeployment out of population centers.

The supposedly enduring quality of the ties between Islamists and the Pakistani army leads Musharraf's critics to two recommendations for U.S. policymakers. First, they argue that Washington should get over its squeamishness about pushing Musharraf and the army to do more in the war on terrorism. They portray Musharraf as a master of doing the least necessary in order to satisfy competing tactical requirements, prioritizing U.S. interests only when the costs of doing otherwise become unacceptably high, as was the case immediately after 9/11. Only an uncompromising stand from Washington, the thinking goes, will scare the Pakistani army straight; the Bush strategy of offering more carrots than sticks should be reversed.

Second, they argue that Washington must sponsor a democratic transition in Pakistan if it wants real progress in fighting terrorism. The Pakistani army has shown itself willing to partner with Islamists in order to dominate domestic politics and project regional influence, whereas Pakistan's progressive parties, especially Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), are said to be self-interested and ideologically committed in their opposition to Islamist militancy. Only a popular mobilization of Pakistan's moderates, the argument goes, can really address the social and developmental deficiencies that ultimately cause extremism.

MISDIAGNOSING THE MILITARY

As convincing as these prescriptions might sound, following them would in fact be counterproductive. Neither coercive threats nor unfettered democracy is likely to yield near-term or sustainable success in the war on terrorism. At the heart of the critics' assessment of Pakistan lies an incorrect assumption about the nature of the army's connection to Islamists. The critics believe that that connection will be impossible, or at least exceedingly difficult, to sever. In fact, a break could come more easily than they think (although, given the long history, it may not happen as quickly or as smoothly as Washington would like). Pakistan's security services maintain these connections less out of ideological sympathy and more out of strategic calculation: as a hedge against abandonment by other allies -- especially the United States.

Fortunately, there are indications that the army would be amenable to a strategic shift. It currently faces very different circumstances than at any other stage in its alliance with the Islamists. During the Cold War, and even until 9/11, the United States tolerated, applauded, or overlooked Pakistan's association with jihadi groups. In regard to Kashmir, Washington was as likely to criticize India for the heavyhandedness of its security forces as to condemn Pakistan's training and financing of "freedom fighters." In Afghanistan, the United States and Pakistan were partners in supporting the mujahideen's anti-Soviet struggle. And in the 1990s, nuclear proliferation concerns distracted Washington's attention from the counterterrorism agenda.

But after 9/11, the diplomatic costs of Pakistan's jihadi strategy started to mount. Overnight, terrorism became the White House's top priority, and Islamabad's semantic distinction between "freedom fighters" and terrorists no longer held water. Overt official ties with Afghanistan's Taliban were the first casualty of the new "with us or against us" era. Soon afterward, the 2001-2 standoff with India forced Musharraf to drop full sponsorship of militants crossing Kashmir's Line of Control. In both instances, Pakistan's ties to Islamists were perceived as having brought on existential threats from outside powers.

The costs of the relationship have gone up in other ways, too. Because of his public commitment to counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, Musharraf is now a marked man, having narrowly survived several jihadi-sponsored attempts on his life. More broadly, the Pakistani army has suffered hundreds of casualties during operations in the FATA, creating new animosities between the security forces and extremists.