The New New World Order

Daniel W. Drezner

From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007

Summary:  Controversies over the war in Iraq and U.S. unilateralism have overshadowed a more pragmatic and multilateral component of the Bush administration's grand strategy: its attempt to reconfigure U.S. foreign policy and international institutions in order to account for shifts in the global distribution of power and the emergence of states such as China and India. This unheralded move is well intentioned and well advised, and Washington should redouble its efforts.

Daniel W. Drezner is Associate Professor of International Politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and the author of "All Politics Is Global."

The Clinton administration had good reasons for not doing more. Remaking international institutions is a thankless task that requires holders of power to voluntarily cede some of their influence. There was no urgent need to undertake it in the 1990s: China and India were rising, but their great-power status still seemed a long ways off. Even minor shifts in long-standing U.S. foreign policy -- such as the reduction of U.S. troops in Germany -- caused great controversy. Most important, the Clinton administration's reinforcement approach worked. The creation of the WTO strengthened the global trade regime. NATO led effective operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) was renewed indefinitely. Despite the occasional gripe about American hyperpower, the United States seemed able to legitimately advance its interests through the adroit use of multilateral diplomacy. By and large, American hegemony went unchallenged.

These gains, however, came with hidden costs. Many of the rising powers believed that the existing global governance structures stacked the deck against them. The IMF's perceived highhandedness during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s bred resentment across the Pacific Rim. New Delhi was frustrated by Washington's objections to its 1998 nuclear tests and grew tired of being viewed by Washington strictly through the prism of South Asian security. China resented the drawn-out negotiations to enter the WTO. And NATO's bombing of Kosovo was triply problematic for Beijing: the accidental hit on the Chinese embassy in Belgrade aroused nationalist passions, Washington's willingness to cross international borders to protect human rights clashed with Beijing's notion of state sovereignty, and the United States' decision to bypass the United Nations and act through NATO highlighted the limits of China's effective influence over world politics. Heading into the new millennium, the fastest-growing economies in the world were nursing grudges toward the United States.

THE NEW DEAL

The Bush administration's response to the September 11 attacks has triggered an avalanche of books about how to rethink U.S. grand strategy. Most of them, pointing to the chaos in Iraq and setbacks in the war on terrorism, condemn the Bush administration's penchant for bellicose unilateralism and assert that a better way is possible. Given the administration's rejection of multilateralism in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, this criticism is well grounded.

But the analysis is incomplete -- even though the rhetorical excesses of former UN Ambassador John Bolton and former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld make it easy to think otherwise. Myriad reasons explain Washington's recent outreach to emerging powers and its concomitant effort to revamp global governance. In part, changes in personnel motivated this shift: it is no coincidence, for example, that most of these outreach efforts have taken place since Condoleezza Rice became secretary of state and have accelerated since Henry Paulson became secretary of the Treasury. In part, change has been foisted on the administration from the outside world. As Philip Gordon, of the Brookings Institution, pointed out in Foreign Affairs last year, failure in Iraq rendered neoconservatism an unsustainable strategy.

But in part, the effort to institutionalize a new great-power concert has been a long-standing component of the Bush administration's foreign policy. And Washington-style multilateralism is above all a means to further U.S. goals. Accordingly, the Bush administration defers to institutions it sees as being effective (say, the WTO) and has consistently sought the enforcement of multilateral norms and decisions it deems important (be they IMF lending agreements or UN Security Council resolutions). But it scorns multilateral institutions that fail to live up to their own stated standards (such as other UN bodies). The 2006 National Security Strategy reiterates Washington's dual position by arguing that great-power consensus "must be supported by appropriate institutions, regional and global, to make cooperation more permanent, effective, and wide-reaching. Where existing institutions can be reformed to meet new challenges, we, along with our partners, must reform them. Where appropriate institutions do not exist, we, along with our partners, must create them."

Global institutions cease to be appropriate when the allocation of decision-making authority within them no longer corresponds to the distribution of power -- and that is precisely the situation today. The UN Security Council is one obvious example; the G-7 is an even more egregious one. The G-7 states took it upon themselves to manage global macroeconomic imbalances in the 1970s. They were moderately successful at the job during the 1980s, when they accounted for half of the world's economic activity. Today, however, even when they meet with Russia (as the G-8), they cannot be effective without including in their deliberations the economic heavyweight that is China.

Incorporating emerging powers while placating status quo states is no simple feat. But the task should appear less daunting when it is understood that success will benefit ascendant states as much as it will the United States. It will bring ascendant states recognition and legitimacy to match their new power. Granted, they will have to accept a multilateral order built on U.S. principles. But they -- especially China and India -- have grown phenomenally by doing just that. Now that they are concerned with sustaining their current high rates of economic growth, emerging powers share some interests with the United States on issues such as the security of energy supplies and the prevention of global pandemics.

ONE-ON-ONE

The Bush team has already made significant efforts to keep up with the changing world. A few years ago, it started to reallocate resources within the U.S. government. More recently, it has spearheaded multilateral efforts to integrate China and India into important international regimes.