How We Fight

Colin H. Kahl

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2006

Summary:  Reports that U.S. troops may have killed 24 civilians in Haditha, Iraq, last November have renewed fears that the U.S. military routinely violates the laws of war. But is the Haditha incident the exception or the rule? In fact, U.S. compliance with noncombatant immunity in Iraq has been relatively high by historical standards, and it has been improving since the beginning of the war.

Colin H. Kahl, Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota, conducted research at the Department of Defense from January 2005 to August 2006 on a fellowship from the Council on Foreign Relations.

Second, the ROE have grown much more restrictive since the beginning of the counterinsurgency period. A review of the evolution of the "shoot/don't shoot" vignettes used to train U.S. forces revealed that interpretations of what constitutes a hostile intent have been sharpened. Commenting on the current ROE, one captain from the Fourth Infantry Division told The Washington Post in February 2006, "What was allowed during the first tour in Iraq, isn't."

Third, troops' training and education have been substantially altered to emphasize counterinsurgency operations and the need to minimize harm to civilians. Cultural awareness is now emphasized, as is the importance of obtaining "actionable" intelligence. U.S. forces are encouraged to favor "cordon and knock" operations over indiscriminate sweeps. The evolution in training is especially evident at the three U.S. predeployment centers, the Joint Readiness Training Center (in Fort Polk, Louisiana), the National Training Center (in Fort Irwin, California), and the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center (in Twentynine Palms, California). These centers now house dozens of mock Iraqi villages populated with Arab Americans simulating civilians on the battlefield.

Together, these changes in TTPs, the ROE, and training appear to have had a positive effect. According to the military's statistics, by mid-2006, the number of Iraqi civilians killed at checkpoints, roadblocks, and alongside convoys had fallen sharply. Reports by embedded correspondents suggest that U.S. troops were behaving in a more restrained manner in 2006 than they had previously, even in insurgent strongholds such as Ramadi, where marines and soldiers have been involved in heavy combat. As one marine corporal conducting operations in Ramadi told the Los Angeles Times in July 2006, "I got shot at last night. We couldn't see where it was coming from, so we did not return fire. We can't spray 'n' pray."

Moreover, in response to criticism over the assaults on Fallujah, U.S. forces have refrained from waging additional urban offensives of such magnitude. The next-largest operation, the September 2005 assault on Tal Afar (an insurgent safe haven 40 miles from the Syrian border), was planned and executed with extraordinary care. Prior to the assault, the U.S. military used radio and television messages, loudspeaker broadcasts, posters and handbills, and airdropped leaflets to encourage residents in insurgent-heavy districts to evacuate. Iraqis who left the city were provided with prepositioned humanitarian supplies in outlying areas; those who stayed were directed to remain in their homes to avoid being mistaken for insurgents. U.S. forces then struck known insurgent safe houses and defensive positions with precision-guided munitions. Attacks were carried out with continual "eyes on the target" and timed to minimize the risk to noncombatants. The bulk of the operation relied on U.S. and Iraqi ground forces, who conducted house-by-house searches. U.S. and Iraqi forces killed or captured hundreds of insurgents, and, according to the U.S. military, only three civilians were caught in the crossfire.

Finally, beyond tactical and operational changes, the U.S. military has been taking steps to institutionalize the lessons learned from Iraq (and Afghanistan) so as to limit repeating its mistakes in the future. A November 2005 directive by the Defense Department states that stability operations "shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all [Department of Defense] activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning." This is truly revolutionary given the U.S. military's long-standing aversion to "military operations other than war," as the term of art goes. Other efforts are under way to adopt a new joint U.S. Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine that is both more effective and more sensitive to the laws of war. The revised doctrine emphasizes the need for using, with great discrimination, the least amount of force possible when attacking insurgents.

FOR THE RECORD

Every war produces significant instances of misconduct, including war crimes. Such violations may be especially likely in a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign, due to the inherent stress of combat, the intense fog of war, the frustration of fighting an unseen enemy, the growing estrangement of the civilian population, and purposeful attempts by guerrillas to drive wedges between the counterinsurgent forces and the civilians these are supposed to protect. In the current conflict in Iraq, the massacre in Haditha stands out as the most serious case of misconduct allegedly committed by U.S. forces.

Still, a careful review of U.S. conduct during the Iraq war reveals no broad pattern of systematic civilian victimization by U.S. forces. U.S. compliance with noncombatant immunity in Iraq has been higher than critics often assert, and adherence has increased over time as the U.S. military has tried to correct its procedures in reaction to instances of noncompliance. Observed through the narrow lens of the laws of war, the U.S. military has gone to commendable lengths to comply with the principles of distinction and proportionality in Iraq.

But although the U.S. military has done more than is generally recognized, it should take additional steps. Under international law and Defense Department policy, it is currently obligated to thoroughly investigate and punish violations of the laws of war. As of mid-2006, the Pentagon claimed to have initiated over 600 investigations in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to allegations of misconduct, most of them relating to the abuse of detainees. But it has not opened investigations into numerous instances in which Iraqi civilians have been killed or injured at checkpoints, alongside convoys, or during combat. Of the investigations that have occurred, many appear to have been administrative inquiries meant to determine whether U.S. forces acted within the confines of their ROE -- and most have concluded that they had. Few criminal investigations have been opened, and few significant punishments have been doled out. Media reports suggest that in the first three years of the war, 16 marines and soldiers were charged with murdering Iraqis, 6 were convicted or pleaded guilty to murder, and a total of 14 were convicted on some charge in connection with the death of an Iraqi. (During the Vietnam War, in contrast, 95 soldiers and 27 marines were convicted of killing noncombatants.) Punishments for those convicted in Iraq have ranged from dismissal to life in prison. No convicted service member has received the death penalty even though murder is a capital offense under the Uniformed Code of Military Justice.

But the events at Haditha may have marked a turning point. The U.S. military initiated a criminal investigation into the alleged massacre in March 2006, and Pentagon officials familiar with the case have told the media that the marines involved will probably stand trial for murder and dereliction of duty. After the initial probe into the deaths was deemed to be highly suspect, moreover, the battalion and company commanders responsible for supervising the incriminated unit were relieved of duty, and additional disciplinary action against officers within the chain of command is possible.