Toxic Thaksin

Duncan McCargo

From www.foreignaffairs.org, September 27, 2006

Summary:  Elected in a landslide just last year, Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was deposed last week in a bloodless overthrow organized by the military. Over the year his fall from grace had been steady and swift, thanks to his abuse of power, repression of the opposition and Muslim minorities, and allegations of corruption. Still, argues Duncan McCargo of the University of Leeds, even if Thaksin deserved to go, the manner of his passing will endanger the country's democracy and stability.

For most informed observers, the question throughout 2006 has been not whether Thaksin would eventually be forced from power but by what means. A farcical snap election in April, which was boycotted by the opposition, was quickly annulled. Despite persistent calls for a royally appointed government--in effect, a royal coup without a military component--the king apparently preferred to leave the courts to resolve the ongoing crisis. One pending case might have dissolved Thai Rak Thai and banned Thaksin from politics for an extended period.

But legal remedies proved slow and uncertain, and although Thaksin kept talking about "taking a break" from office, he never formally resigned as prime minister or nominated a successor to head his party. Another possibility was that Thaksin might be toppled by massive street demonstrations. One such demonstration had been scheduled for September 20 (the day after the coup occurred). But there were fears that Thaksin supporters might use the occasion to whip up violence, so as to create a pretext to crack down against the opposition.

Few objective observers will shed tears for Thaksin, who could claim electoral legitimacy but had proved so divisive that he could no longer govern Thailand effectively. Still, it is deeply distressing that, despite all the supposed lessons of the turbulent 1990s, Thailand's civilian political institutions could not rein in a prime minister who began to abuse his powers and authority. The September 19 coup is a deeply anachronistic event that sets Thailand's political clock back by 15 long and bitter years. If the legacy of the 1991 coup is anything to go by, popular disillusionment will develop this time, too, with attendant consequences that could eventually overshadow the military intervention itself.

Simply put, Thailand's citizens have higher political expectations today than they did in 1991 and are unlikely to find an extended period of quasi-military rule very palatable. If the new administration allows Thaksin to retain some of his power or political influence, pro- and anti-Thaksin divisions could easily re-emerge. Even once civilian rule is restored--which Sonthi has promised will happen by October 2007--the threat of renewed military interference or violence on the streets of Bangkok will remain very real.

To date, the public stance of the United States has been far too ambiguous: a strong statement from a senior member of the administration is overdue. Thaksin deserved to go, but not in this crude, retrograde fashion, which sets a dangerous precedent both for Thailand and the wider region.