In Search of Hugo Chávez

Michael Shifter

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2006

Summary:  The debate over Hugo Chávez has been dominated by opposing caricatures -- a polarization that has thwarted a sound policy response. The Venezuelan president has an autocratic streak, no viable development model, and unsettling oil-funded aspirations to hemispheric leadership. But Washington and its allies should ''confront'' him indirectly: by proving they have better ideas.

MICHAEL SHIFTER is Vice President for Policy at the Inter-American Dialogue and Adjunct Professor of Latin American Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

When Chávez entered politics six years later, his combative style and straight-talking populist charisma served him well in a country marked by pervasive discontent. His fierce indictment of the old political order -- and his promise of a "revolution" in honor of South America's liberator, Simon Bolívar -- held wide appeal among poor Venezuelans. Unlike the "out of touch" politicians, Chávez projected a sincere concern for those living in poverty. In Venezuela, that meant three-quarters of the population.

Chávez's political project has been an eclectic blend of populism, nationalism, militarism, and, most recently, socialism, combined with a "Bolivarian" emphasis on South American unity. Chávez sees himself as the embodiment of the popular will. "Participatory democracy," focused on empowering and mobilizing Venezuelans, is the essence of Chavismo. Taking advantage of his communication skills, Chávez, a consummate showman, speaks directly to the Venezuelan public through his Sunday television program, Aló Presidente, thereby cementing his bond with the masses.

Behind democratic trappings and a fig leaf of legitimacy, Chávez has concentrated power to an astonishing degree. Although he benefited considerably from the complete collapse of the old order, he has also proved to be an astute and skilled politician, despite being frequently dismissed as a mere buffoon. He has constructed his edifice of power through a succession of elections, including a 1999 referendum for a new constitution. That new "Bolivarian" constitution allowed consecutive reelection for the president and set up an electoral council that is a fourth branch of government.

The contours of Chávez's "illiberal" regime have become increasingly better defined over the past seven years. Virtually all key decisions are in the hands of the president. The rule of law is at best peripheral. The Electoral Council and the National Assembly have become mere appendages of the executive. In May 2004, Chávez took advantage of majority support in the National Assembly to have a measure passed that increased the number of Supreme Court justices from 20 to 32, thus allowing him to pack the court with handpicked political loyalists.

To be sure, dissent is permitted, and the largely privately owned media still frequently criticize Chávez. But instruments have been put in place to clamp down, if deemed necessary, on critical voices. According to the criminal code, it is now an offense to show disrespect for the president and other government authorities, punishable by up to 20 months in jail. A December 2004 Social Responsibility Law comes close to censorship by imposing "administrative restrictions" on radio and television broadcasts. The measure has been strongly condemned by various groups, including the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, a body of the Organization of American States (OAS). By raising the disturbing possibility of arbitrary enforcement, such restrictions have had a chilling effect on the press. There is also credible anecdotal evidence of the existence of lists of individuals' votes that have been used to deny Chávez's opponents jobs and services.

To rule, Chávez depends chiefly on the military, the institution he knows best and trusts most. Thanks to a specially tailored law, Chávez remains an active military officer, and more than one-third of the country's regional governments are in the hands of soldiers directly linked to Chávez. As the editor of the daily Tal Cual, Teodoro Petkoff, has noted, "For all practical purposes, this is a government of the armed forces." Moreover, the government has been organizing private unarmed militias and developing plans to mobilize up to two million reservists in the name of national defense. Citizen power, as reflected in such groups as government-sponsored neighborhood "Bolivarian Circles," helps undergird the regime (and represents the fifth branch of government, according to the 1999 constitution). Chávez has shown little desire to build a coherent party, relying instead on the heterogeneous political grouping he calls the Fifth Republic Movement.

Chávez's strategies have been particularly effective in the face of an opposition that has been consistently inept and is now weaker than ever. It has used various tactics -- a coup, a national strike, and a recall referendum -- in a quest to unseat Chávez but has never had a viable strategy, an alternative program, or effective leadership. In April 2002, a failed coup not only raised questions about the democratic credentials of the opposition; it also gave Chávez the perfect pretext to take full control of the armed forces, purging any dissidents. The strike at the end of 2002 enabled Chávez to establish control over the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA). And the August 2004 recall referendum ended up enhancing his legitimacy when he won. Last December, the opposition's decision to boycott elections for the National Assembly left Chávez's coalition with control of all 167 seats. Looking ahead to the December 2006 presidential vote, it is hard to see how the opposition could regroup to mount a serious challenge. Although polls vary, they suggest Chávez is in a very strong political position, with popular support hovering around 50 percent, placing him far ahead of his closest challenger.

Chávez is frequently compared to Castro and Libya's Muammar al-Qaddafi, as well as to Bolívar. The more apt historical precedent is Argentina's Juan Perón. Perón, too, was a military figure who attempted a coup and used his considerable oratorical skills to attack the political establishment and make rousing appeals to the downtrodden. Even Chávez's audacious decision to provide discounted home heating oil to poor families in the United States through the Venezuela subsidiary CITGO echoes the actions of the mythic Argentine first lady who supplied clothes for 600 needy American children in 1949. "Shrewd Evita Perón knew a good chance when she saw one," Time magazine noted, and the same is true of Chávez. And like Juan Perón, whose Peronism dominates Argentina to this day, Chávez is likely to succeed in building a social and political force -- Chavismo -- that will endure for some time.

BROKEN RECORD

The opposition's lack of success stems from its past unwillingness even to recognize -- let alone devise solutions to -- the deep social problems that Chávez has identified. Chávez's government, meanwhile, has undertaken important social programs and launched workers' cooperatives in urban slums. Plans are under way to set up "social production companies" that would extend the state sector and seek to distribute earnings among workers and community projects. Venezuela's oil wealth has made massive expenditures possible -- an estimated $20 billion in the past three years alone on programs to provide food, education, and medical care to underserved populations -- which have undeniably had some effect.