Furthering Democracy in MexicoFrom Foreign Affairs, January/February 2006 Article ToolsSummary: As it approaches its first presidential election in the post-PRI era, Mexico is at a crossroads: it could either consolidate democracy and proceed with needed reforms or fall back into a familiar state of crisis. Which way it goes will depend above all on the candidates of the three major political parties, who must rise above their short-term interests to further the nation's progress toward democratic stability. ENRIQUE KRAUZE is Editor in Chief of Letras Libres and the author of Mexico: Biography of Power. [continued...]The center-right PAN has existed for 66 years. From its beginnings as a minor opposition party within the firmly controlled oligarchic system administered by the PRI, the PAN has always been a strong advocate of electoral democracy. It showed an impressive (and sometimes heroic) tenacity in resisting and surviving the assaults of the PRI machine. But this has also meant that the PAN has usually been more focused on limiting power than on exercising it -- a quality that has hurt it since taking over the presidency. When the PAN's historic moment arrived, it had in Fox a leader who, as the head of a huge pro-democracy movement, "moved souls" -- just as Madero had done in his initial presidential campaign against Díaz, in 1910. (That campaign was truncated by Madero's arrest, but the uprising it sparked lifted him to the presidency anyway.) For this impact, Fox deserves much credit. Still, Fox and his party bear some of the responsibility for the stagnation and the deterioration of political life during the past five years. His performance has been the target of a range of legitimate critiques, as well as a host of less noble attacks -- including the kind of ferocious newspaper cartoons that the press deployed against Madero during his presidency, helping to undermine his status as "the apostle of democracy." As president, Fox has not done any major damage (unlike many of the PRI'S authoritarian presidents), but he has not done enough real good either. This failure in part stems from the composition of Congress: since the PAN is outnumbered, the PRI and the PRD have often been able to block Fox's projects. But the PAN deserves some blame for the frequent impasses as well. The party has maintained an incomprehensible distance from the president -- largely because of internal rivalries -- and has never presented the public with a clear and coherent list of necessary reforms. Fox himself has also shown significant limitations. In his personal style, he has been erratic, sometimes prone to rash decisions, absurd statements, and a lack of leadership at critical moments. His wife's frivolous behavior (such as publicly claiming to be governing jointly with the president) and attempted intrusions (without any real qualifications) into the process of government have further hurt his reputation. And his cabinet choices have not helped either. In 1967, one of the PAN's founders said that should the party ever win the presidency, its leader should make every effort to select the best possible people for his cabinet -- perhaps even reaching beyond the party and negotiating a government of national unity. In contrast to that vision, Fox's cabinet has generally consisted of mediocre loyalists and has had a frequently shifting makeup and too many inexperienced members. In spite of all this, Fox has retained a certain amount of public affection. His lingering popularity largely stems from the fact that he has not become corrupt, notwithstanding some charges to the contrary. Many ordinary Mexicans view him as "a good person." Moreover, he deserves credit for some real accomplishments. He has succeeded in preserving macroeconomic stability (although without reducing unemployment or significantly improving growth). He has respected the division of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and the principles of federalism. He has introduced and implemented a law requiring open financial accounting in government, which has certainly reduced corruption. Labor and management have generally been at peace, and various democratic reforms, for which the cornerstone was laid under Zedillo, have continued and been expanded. And Mexico now enjoys true freedom of expression, an important achievement. But Fox has also been a disappointment for many. A great leader during the campaign, he has been a colorless president. He has not fulfilled his promises to fight crime and insecurity (a critical failure in the view of many Mexicans) and to generate tangible social progress (his apparent commitment to which won him much support among poor Mexicans in 2000). Fox is likely to occupy a place in history very much like that of his Polish friend Lech Walesa: remembered as a brave and beloved figure in the struggle against authoritarianism but a failure in handling the reins of power. The final judgment on Fox will affect the fortunes of the PAN candidate in 2006. Although the PAN might deserve a second chance, if only for its contributions to Mexico's democracy, actually winning another election is likely to be difficult. The party has, however, found an excellent candidate in Felipe Calderón. The son of one of the party's founders, he is honest, intelligent, experienced, a skilled debater, and, at 43, relatively young. If Calderón and the PAN can manage to win the presidency, the prospects for an effective government will depend in part on his political skill and strength as a leader, but even more on his capacity to establish alliances with disaffected members of the other two parties -- something easier said than done. PRI traditionalists would probably ally themselves with the PRD in Congress, leaving the PAN a minority in the House and the Senate once again. In that case, Calderón's victory could be a bitter one, because he would encounter the same kind of congressional resistance that has hobbled Fox. Mexico would have to wait until 2012 to start truly debating and undertaking necessary reforms -- and such a long wait could cause a return to instability. With seven months left before the elections, however, it is probable that the PAN will be punished because of the widely held perception that Fox has not governed effectively. If that turns out to be the case, the PAN will have a chance to draw lessons from its brief experience with power, to encourage the rise of new leaders, to renew its image and its now-antiquated platform, to distance itself from stubbornly reactionary positions (still strong within the party) on social and moral issues, and to prepare itself for the elections of 2012. As a strong party of opposition, the PAN could do what it has always done best: fight to limit power and, in some measure, channel it; perform responsibly in Congress; help to clarify issues for the public; and continue to struggle in general for democracy and political harmony. And it can push for its economic program, which supports globalization, foreign investment, and orthodox fiscal and monetary policies. PERFECT DICTATORSHIP, REDUX After losing the presidency in 2000, the PRI has regrouped more successfully than almost anyone anticipated. In fact, the defeat may have been to the PRI's long-term benefit, because it gave the party a chance to start cleaning up its image. The PRI is an ideological chameleon: it can push nationalist and corporatist measures, or it can push openness and globalization -- whichever is most convenient at any given moment. But the moral burden of its past is considerable. Under PRI rule, Mexico enjoyed decades of stability and economic growth, and, with the exception of the tumultuous years of the late 1960s and early 1970s, violent confrontations were few and far between. But everything was a gift from above, from a power that lacked democratic legitimacy and was managed by an ever more corrupt oligarchy, entrance to which could be secured only by working within the PRI.
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