What If the British Vote No?

Charles Grant

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005

Summary:  If ratified, the new EU constitution will change the way the union works. It cannot take effect unless approved by all 25 members, but in only one country -- the United Kingdom -- do polls show that a majority oppose the document. Still, a rejection there would throw Europe into a constitutional crisis. And it could ultimately harm transatlantic relations as well.

Charles Grant is Director of the Centre for European Reform in London and the author of What Happens If Britain Votes No? Ten Ways Out of a European Constitutional Crisis.

Ever since it joined the union, the United Kingdom has been an influential member, well placed to represent U.S. interests, when it so chooses. But stuck in an outer circle of the EU, the British would be less able to nudge union policies in an Atlanticist direction. (The same applies to other close U.S. allies, such as Poland and the Baltic countries, which are unlikely to join the core.) The United Kingdom would lose influence not only over the policy areas covered by the core, but also over those that remained under the EU's general ambit. Indeed, bound together by common interests, the core countries would likely support each other even in fields that involved all the EU members. Such mutual back-scratching has been evident in the past between France and Germany: at the Berlin EU summit in March 1999, because of Germany's broader interest in maintaining its alliance with France, Schröder let Chirac unravel a radical reform of the Common Agricultural Policy that Germany (and the United Kingdom) supported.

British rejection of the constitution would also halt further EU enlargement. The United States has always, with good reason, favored expanding the EU, understanding that the process helps spread security, democracy, and prosperity. But the union can only negotiate the entry of new members when it has clearly defined rules and stable institutions. French politicians have stated explicitly that the EU cannot admit new nations unless the constitutional treaty is implemented. They have a point: the basic purpose of the treaty is to reform EU institutions so that they can accommodate more members. Bulgaria and Romania, due to join in 2007, are so close to membership that they will probably get in no matter what happens with the constitution. But the treaty's rejection would scuttle talks with Turkey and Croatia, which are due to start this year, and force Ukraine and countries in the western Balkans to postpone their membership ambitions. It is true that in the long run, if the constitution were abandoned and a core established, the EU member states would probably not object to further enlargement -- but only so long as the aspirants did not join the core.

Economically, a European core dominated by Paris and Berlin would likely lean toward defensive or possibly protectionist economic policies that would not be in Washington's best interests. Most of the union's more dynamic economies -- those of the United Kingdom, Poland, and the Nordic and Baltic countries -- would be outside the central group. There are, of course, successful companies and industries in France and Germany, but both countries have been plagued by slow growth and high unemployment, and they have lagged behind in the EU's "Lisbon process" of economic reform (the member states have committed to reaching a series of economic targets and are supposed to achieve them through peer-group pressure, among other means). Although the core would probably not inflict great damage on the broader European market, the overall credibility of the Lisbon process would suffer if the leadership group consisted mainly of foot-draggers. The core countries' efforts to maintain high levels of worker protection and company taxation could harm their competitiveness with eastern Europe's low-tax, lightly regulated economies. Europe's leaders would be unlikely to push the continent to abandon the policies that have led to low growth and high unemployment.

A core led by France and Germany would also have its own approach to foreign policy, which would be relatively anti-American (although that could change after the German general election in the fall of 2006 and the French presidential election the following summer). The countries that were most hostile to the Iraq war -- France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and, following the electoral victory of President José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, Spain -- would be in the forefront of any core. Led by Chirac and Schröder, the core countries would promote a multipolar world, with Europe as one emerging pole. At the same time, the EU's periphery, including the United Kingdom and Poland, would tend toward Atlanticism. With that kind of split foreign policy, Europe could not develop into a more effective strategic actor. To be sure, some in the Bush administration would be quite happy to see Europe remain divided, so that they could play the various member states off of one another. But others -- including Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, to judge from her comments in Europe in February -- stress that Washington needs Europe to help it tackle global security threats. They understand that a divided Europe cannot be a useful strategic partner.

The British have long played a pivotal role in helping the Americans and continental Europeans understand each other. If the United Kingdom becomes alienated from the continent and its leadership core, transatlantic relations will suffer. Washington is more likely to listen to, and respect, a Europe that is strong and whole. The Bush administration should pay serious attention to the ratification of the EU's constitutional treaty. When appropriate, the White House should even urge the peoples of Europe to adopt it. The treaty's implementation would not radically change the way the EU works. But if the treaty were rejected by a large member state such as the United Kingdom, the ensuing crisis would turn the union inwards, toward endless institutional negotiations, and away from the global challenges that the United States and Europe need to face together. Such a weak and divided Europe would strengthen the hand of unilateralists in the United States and of Europeans eager to work against Washington's interests.