What If the British Vote No?

Charles Grant

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005

Summary:  If ratified, the new EU constitution will change the way the union works. It cannot take effect unless approved by all 25 members, but in only one country -- the United Kingdom -- do polls show that a majority oppose the document. Still, a rejection there would throw Europe into a constitutional crisis. And it could ultimately harm transatlantic relations as well.

Charles Grant is Director of the Centre for European Reform in London and the author of What Happens If Britain Votes No? Ten Ways Out of a European Constitutional Crisis.

Leaving aside long-term trends, there are immediate reasons why Britons opposed to the constitutional treaty are confident of a referendum victory. The press is on their side. Three out of every four newspapers sold in the United Kingdom are extremely hostile to the EU and its constitution. Much of their reporting of the constitution's drawbacks is exaggerated, and some of it is false. Popular newspapers claim, for example, that the constitution would force the United Kingdom to give up its seat on the United Nations Security Council; that Brussels bureaucrats would command British troops, control British oil reserves, and regulate British borders; and that the EU would gain new powers to interfere in the U.K. labor market. None of these points is true, but the popular press knows how to frighten people. Of course, some of the horror stories are real: the EU's administration has been tarnished by corruption scandals, and the Common Agricultural Policy, although reformed, continues to swallow more than 40 percent of the EU budget. But instead of reporting these flaws in a measured and evenhanded tone, popular papers tend to portray the EU as a conspiracy led by France and Germany to promote their interests against those of the United Kingdom.

Furthermore, advertisements in the media routinely attack the EU constitution, while none support it. The various anti-EU lobbying groups are well organized and well funded. Their combined budgets are probably between five and ten times greater than the $1.25 million spent in 2004 by the United Kingdom's single pro-EU lobbying group, called Britain in Europe. Traditionally, British business leaders have been pro-European, and particularly pro-euro. But they have been angered by the Labour government's failure to deliver on its promise to hold a referendum on the currency, and they refuse to fund the pro-constitution campaign unless the government leads the way. So far, however, Downing Street has kept quiet: its priority is to win the general election expected in May. Only then will the government try to convince people to support the constitution.

Does the new treaty have any chance of passing? Possibly. Pro-Europeans have not given up hope of winning the referendum. They expect that when the government does finally start trying to win support for the constitution, money will flow into their organizations. They believe they will be able to reveal many of the Euroskeptics' claims to be false and that many voters will ultimately look less to the popular press for information on the treaty than to the BBC, which will be more objective. And if the rest of the EU has endorsed the treaty by the time the United Kingdom votes, the British people may start to fear isolation. If Britons believe that a vote for the constitution is a vote for the status quo -- and that a vote against would create chaos and uncertainty -- they could conceivably endorse the treaty. But the odds remain slim. Most political commentators continue to predict that British voters will reject the new constitution.

THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW

If the British do decide to vote no, but the other member states adopt the treaty, the future of the EU could take one of six courses. The first possibility is that nothing would happen. The other countries would accept the death of the constitutional treaty and would simply continue operating with the existing treaties. This outcome, however, is not plausible: most EU governments do not like the existing treaties and believe that the newly enlarged union -- ten countries joined in May 2004 -- will not run smoothly without the constitution.

Second, the member states could choose to renegotiate the constitutional treaty. A new intergovernmental conference could cut out the most controversial parts, making it more palatable to British tastes. But this option is no more realistic than the first. Many governments fear that revisiting the hard-fought compromises enshrined in the treaty could result in a less attractive deal. Having already made big concessions to the United Kingdom to ensure that Prime Minister Tony Blair would sign, they are not prepared to give away any more. Nor would they want to go through the ratification process all over again.

Under a third scenario, the British would hold a second referendum on the constitutional treaty, as the Danes did after first rejecting the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and as the Irish did after voting against the Nice Treaty in 2001. In this case, however, such a stratagem would not make sense. Because the Maastricht Treaty extended the EU's role in defense, immigration, and monetary policy, the Danes could be offered ways out of those three areas before a second vote. Similarly, the EU was able to guarantee Ireland's neutral status, to appease those Irish who worried that the Nice Treaty's provisions on defense would compromise their neutrality. The trouble with the constitutional treaty is that it mainly covers matters impossible for a single member to bypass: EU institutions and voting rules. In the one area in which it does extend significant EU powers -- justice and home affairs -- the United Kingdom is already free not to adopt union measures.

Three more-likely scenarios remain. One would be for the other 24 member states to enact the treaty, forcing the British to leave the EU. Some prominent continental politicians, such as former French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and former French Finance Minister Nicolas Sarkozy, say that the British should not be allowed to block the treaty. Legally, the 24 cannot adopt the treaty without British ratification, but there may be a way around that obstacle. The 24 could withdraw from the existing EU treaties, redraft the constitutional treaty among themselves, and then sign and ratify it. (The 1969 Vienna Convention on international treaties allows signatories to withdraw in certain circumstances, although there is some legal doubt as to how this process would work.) The United Kingdom would then have to negotiate an associate status similar to that of Norway and Switzerland, which enjoy access to the EU market but cannot vote on its rules.

The British may assume that they are too special to be cast adrift. They should not. For the EU's more integrationist countries, the United Kingdom has been a constant bother, often thwarting schemes for a more united Europe. If the Conservative Party and the popular press used their referendum victory as a springboard to campaign for quitting the EU; if British politicians of all parties sought popularity through cheap attacks on Paris, Berlin, and Brussels; and if the government lacked the mettle to oppose them, the United Kingdom would find itself friendless.