Gaza: Moving Forward by Pulling Back

David Makovsky

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005

Summary:  Despite widespread calls to rush to a final-status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it would be a mistake to reach for so much so soon. The parties must first restore trust after four and a half years of violence, above all by making sure that Israel's planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip proceeds smoothly, leaving peace and security in its wake.

David Makovsky is Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. This article is based on the forthcoming study Engagement Through Disengagement: Gaza and the Potential for Middle East Peacemaking, published by the Washington Institute.

The MFO is the most logical choice to supplement the work of Egyptian border patrols for a variety of reasons. It already has a mandate to work in the area and is familiar to all the parties involved. Senior Egyptian military officials, such as General Omar Suleiman, the head of Egyptian intelligence, say that they would welcome the MFO's deployment on the Gaza border. Privately, both Israeli and Palestinian officials say the same. Most important, the MFO would be useful because the framework for it already exists, eliminating the need to embark on a lengthy process of creating a new force. (It took a year and a half to assemble the current MFO; every year, Egypt, Israel, and the United States each contribute $17 million for its upkeep.) Although simply diverting personnel from the MFO's current mission may not suit the needs of the new task, its configuration could be quickly enhanced, and the parties involved could then determine if it should be legally considered an "additive" force or a separate "MFO II."

By sole virtue of its presence, the MFO would raise the diplomatic costs to the Egyptians of failing to secure the border with Gaza. It would at the same time ease the burden on them by monitoring the access of potential infiltrators and assisting on patrols. Perhaps with the help of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, an upgraded MFO could also provide technological assistance to help deal with the tunnel problem; for example, seismic technology could detect new tunnels. Once Gaza has functioning air- and seaports, the MFO could also assist other forces (including private consultants) in providing security.

Alternative options are not attractive for a variety of reasons. Israel would not accept UN involvement, given the critical nature of the smuggling issue and Israel's adversarial interactions with the international body in recent decades. A NATO force -- which must operate under the consensus of its 26 member states and risks becoming politicized -- could not be established quickly enough and might not be nimble enough to adjust to changing realities on the ground; a NATO role may be viable at some point, but not in the short term. A U.S.-dominated force, meanwhile, is infeasible given that the U.S. military is already overburdened; with the MFO, the bulk of the troops already comes from other governments. What is required is Washington's leadership, not a massive number of U.S. troops.

To coordinate and implement effective border security, a consultative forum should be created for the PA, Israel, Egypt, and the MFO to discuss ongoing security concerns. Such a mechanism exists under the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and it could be extended to cover issues relating to the Gaza border. The logical place for ongoing (and perhaps daily) consultation is Kerem Shalom, the border area adjacent to the southeast corner of Gaza (and the site of a new border crossing, designed to avert violence in the Rafah area). There is no reason why Egyptian, Israeli, Palestinian, and MFO officials should not have an "operations room" to discuss and iron out any problems that may arise. Such a move would facilitate security, ensure that affairs run smoothly, and allay suspicions on all sides. Without regular communication, misunderstandings are bound to occur.

OPEN AND SHUT?

In addition to security efforts, the United States should support programs to promote economic development in a post-withdrawal Gaza. Washington should work closely with the World Bank on infrastructure and construction projects, job creation, donor assistance, and trade facilitation through efforts such as upgrading the Karni crossing to ease travel conditions for Palestinians. Overseas Private Investment Corporation insurance could encourage further foreign investment.

Washington should do all it can to encourage Arab states to play a constructive role in the peace process. Some Arab states have begun to realize that violence in the West Bank hurts them by demonstrating their own impotence. Others, such as Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, are reeling from internal demonstrations in support of democratization, giving the United States a new source of leverage to get them behind the peace process. Tunisia, with its government under assault from Washington, recently invited Sharon to a conference in Tunis.

Arab states can first of all help delegitimize suicide bombing by making it clear that such "martyrdom" attacks are politically counterproductive, morally wrong, and only impede the creation of a Palestinian state. Such an imprimatur would make it easier for the PA to combat terror. Second, the Gulf states can help bolster the PA financially. Gulf governments have reaped tens of billions in extra oil profit over the past two years but have failed to meet even the minimal commitment of $55 million a month in aid to the PA. (World Bank officials say only $9 million a month has arrived.) In total, Arab League governments owe the PA $891.8 million. Arab governments must demonstrate that their support for the Palestinians goes beyond mere rhetoric. Significant new funds would allow the PA to reliably deliver basic services, thereby weakening Hamas. Third, Arab states should put forward an "Arab road map" to demonstrate to the Israelis that steps toward peace will result in greater regional integration and not make Israel more vulnerable. The recent return of Egypt's and Jordan's ambassadors to Israel is a promising step. Washington can help by pushing for the reopening of quasi-diplomatic liaison offices throughout the Middle East (they were closed in 2000) and new multilateral talks on issues such as economic development.

By working with the PA, Israel, and Egypt, as well as its fellow members of "the Quartet" -- the UN, the European Union, and Russia -- the United States can at least somewhat reduce the likelihood that terrorist groups will ruin the Israeli disengagement from Gaza. Members of the Quartet must use their leverage over Iran, which backs the radical groups to varying degrees. Its support of terrorism should be raised during all consultations with Iran, including the current nuclear negotiations. Abbas recently sent an envoy to Beirut and Damascus urging them not to spoil the fragile cease-fire. Syria in particular -- which is now feeling the heat for its occupation of Lebanon and for housing militants -- must be forced to prevent rejectionist groups from operating from its soil to disrupt the calm.