Gaza: Moving Forward by Pulling Back

David Makovsky

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005

Summary:  Despite widespread calls to rush to a final-status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it would be a mistake to reach for so much so soon. The parties must first restore trust after four and a half years of violence, above all by making sure that Israel's planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip proceeds smoothly, leaving peace and security in its wake.

David Makovsky is Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. This article is based on the forthcoming study Engagement Through Disengagement: Gaza and the Potential for Middle East Peacemaking, published by the Washington Institute.

So far, Washington's approach has been to provide security and economic assistance but avoid micromanaging the disengagement process. In his most recent State of the Union address, Bush announced that he would give the PA $350 million in aid. And, as announced by Secretary of State Rice, he will dispatch Lieutenant General William "Kip" Ward to help restructure the PA's security services and facilitate cooperation between Israel and the PA.

Apart from reactivating the road map, Washington should focus on a number of short-term tasks to facilitate a successful withdrawal from Gaza -- ensuring that the Israeli pullout is complete and that Israel's safety is not compromised in the wake of it. To this end, Washington should work to revive Israeli-Palestinian security coordination, ensure a viable cease-fire, and maintain calm on the ground by training Palestinian security personnel and working with Egypt to reconfigure the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) currently stationed in Sinai to patrol the border between Gaza and Egypt. These measures would build much-needed confidence between the Israelis and the Palestinians.

A successful revival of security coordination after several years of violence would have multiple benefits for both sides. Security is the cornerstone of coexistence, and sustained coordination would help rebuild trust between the two parties. Moreover, a better security environment would improve conditions on the ground for Palestinians by reducing the need for checkpoints. Israeli Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz has also said that Israel is willing to pull out of major West Bank cities as soon as the PA is ready to accept responsibility for controlling these areas.

Most important, security coordination would facilitate a successful withdrawal from Gaza. A coordinated pullout is more likely than a unilateral move by Israel to lead to a smooth transfer of authority. To avoid destabilization after the withdrawal, it is important that the PA be committed to the terms of the pullout.

Both sides have taken encouraging steps toward cooperation, showing greater sensitivity to the other side's domestic concerns than in the past. Sharon has released several hundred prisoners and agreed to halt targeted killings of suspected terrorists and the demolition of homes belonging to the families of suicide bombers. Abbas, for his part, has sacked Palestinian security chiefs who were considered corrupt Arafat cronies and ordered his troops to disrupt arms smuggling and rocket attacks on Israel.

If there is to be a viable cease-fire, the United States must take the lead in ensuring that it takes hold and is maintained. In order to avoid ambiguity, Washington should get the terms of the cease-fire in writing. And if the United States pressures Israel to uphold its half of the bargain, then perhaps Egypt can help Abbas secure Palestinian support as well.

Abbas must take on rejectionists with a blend of confrontation and competition. Confrontation does not have to be massive to be effective. Abbas should start with an array of important measures: closing rocket labs, arresting some key operatives, and removing certain imams who are inciting violence. He should also make clear that suicide bombing is counterproductive. Having campaigned on this issue, he has a mandate to act on it.

In addition to such measures, Abbas needs to neutralize Hamas and other militant groups with a new political and economic strategy. Two weeks after Abbas won a majority in Gaza in presidential elections, Hamas swept municipal elections there thanks to its track record of providing essential social services, from health care to education, not being delivered by the government. The PA, accordingly, must be capable of supporting both private- and public-sector groups that can replace Hamas as providers of such services. It must also show clear economic results, proving the financial benefits of nonviolence, and reduce corruption in the mainstream Fatah Party.

A key security challenge will be stopping weapons smuggling into Gaza from Sinai. The MFO deployed along the Egyptian side of the Gaza border under Washington's leadership could work with Egypt's newly upgraded 750-member border police. Egyptian aid is crucial, as the Egyptians know the local geography and culture. Weapons smuggling has proved to be one of the most difficult issues surrounding the Gaza withdrawal. But the combined efforts of the Egyptian border police and the MFO could prove effective in stemming the flow of weapons. In the aftermath of the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, families living on both sides of the border built tunnels to transport illicit goods. Today, the tunnels are used to bring in weapons as well. (In order to end weapons smuggling, it will also be necessary to generate economic development, since many families depend on the smuggling of other goods for their livelihood.)

The MFO stationed in Sinai was created in 1981, when the UN refused to endorse the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and accept observer status under the terms of the treaty. It has some 2,000 troops from 11 countries (including two U.S. battalions) operating under U.S. civilian and military leadership, with its headquarters in Rome. Its mission is to prevent a massive remilitarization of the Sinai. The general calm on the Israeli-Egyptian border that has prevailed since the peace treaty means the MFO is likely to be open to adjusting its mission.