Gaza: Moving Forward by Pulling Back

David Makovsky

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2005

Summary:  Despite widespread calls to rush to a final-status agreement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, it would be a mistake to reach for so much so soon. The parties must first restore trust after four and a half years of violence, above all by making sure that Israel's planned withdrawal from the Gaza Strip proceeds smoothly, leaving peace and security in its wake.

David Makovsky is Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and a lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. This article is based on the forthcoming study Engagement Through Disengagement: Gaza and the Potential for Middle East Peacemaking, published by the Washington Institute.

On the Israeli side, jumping to final status would undermine positive short-term dynamics. The Gaza disengagement plan has created a right-wing opposition to Sharon. If the United States or the international community were to present a blueprint for final status and press Israel to accept it, there is little doubt that Sharon's government would collapse and his disengagement plan would be thwarted. Sharon, a vociferous critic of the 2000 Camp David talks and the Clinton parameters for a final peace agreement, might have to come out against Washington. If forced to confront controversial issues when distrust of Palestinian intentions still runs high, he could lose the broad support of the public and his national unity government.

From Washington's perspective, meanwhile, presenting a U.S.-backed blueprint for final status before calm and confidence have been restored on the ground would be counterproductive on several fronts. The experience of 2000 demonstrates that for any agreement to succeed, Arab states must give vocal support to it so that the Palestinian leader will have the political cover he needs to compromise on questions central to Palestinian identity. Since Arab governments have been unwilling to do this, it is preferable to focus on practical steps, especially a successful disengagement from Gaza.

The Bush administration has already used language to guide the next steps in the peace process. President Bush is the first U.S. leader to have articulated support for a solution with two states, Israel and Palestine, and he has emphasized the importance of a Palestinian state being independent and contiguous. In a June 24, 2002, speech he declared:

Ultimately, Israelis and Palestinians must address the core issues that divide them if there is to be a real peace, resolving all claims and ending the conflict between them. This means that the Israeli occupation that began in 1967 will be ended through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338, with Israeli withdrawal to secure and recognized borders.

Palestinians and Arabs positively interpreted this reference to 1967 as signaling a commitment to ensuring the viability of West Bank territories in the future Palestinian state.

Instead of making a high-risk move to final status, Washington should use this moment of opportunity to facilitate confidence-building measures between the Israelis and the Palestinians. One way of signaling progress and bringing the sides closer together would be to formally activate the first phase of the road map. The road map certainly has its disadvantages. Since the Israelis and the Palestinians did not negotiate the document themselves, they do not feel a sense of ownership over the process it prescribes. But it is the only diplomatic framework broadly acceptable to both parties and backed by the international community. Recognizing that shattered trust is the legacy of the last several years, its guidelines are rooted in gradualism but focused on the ultimate goal of guaranteeing security for the Israelis and a state for the Palestinians. Following UN Security Council Resolution 242 -- the document that has traditionally guided the peace process -- the road map's three-phase approach demands parallel performances, generating compromises and obligations on both sides.

The first phase of the road map calls for initial confidence-building measures. As demonstrated by the recent Palestinian elections and Abbas' public commitment to reforming the PA and restructuring its security services, this phase is essentially being implemented already. Since his election, Abbas has talked about the road map as the way forward and -- in line with the document's initial requirements -- taken some preliminary measures to eliminate incitement to violence. (These steps can be reinforced by a review of the PA educational curriculum and a crackdown on imams who use incendiary language.) Despite some reservations, Israel has expressed support for the road map's guidelines as well. Israel's willingness to move forward will of course be contingent on the PA's willingness to fight terrorism, but Israel should start by honoring its commitment under the road map to remove unauthorized settlement outposts in the West Bank and curb settlement activity.

A formal activation of the first phase would demonstrate that Washington remains committed to the road map's "performance-based approach" and to preserving the balance inherent in that idea. More important, it would show that a withdrawal from Gaza will not be an isolated step. For the Palestinians, this would provide evidence that Abbas has succeeded in ensuring U.S. involvement in the peace process -- which would help prevent "Gaza first" from becoming "Gaza last."

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