The Future of Palestine

Khalil Shikaki

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004

Summary:  The current turmoil in the Gaza Strip represents the most serious challenge to Yasir Arafat's authority in decades. Israel's planned disengagement from Gaza brought to a boil long-simmering tensions among Palestinian factions demanding a change in the status quo. Holding national elections before the pullout may be the only way to avoid chaos and save any chance at Middle East peace.

Khalil Shikaki is Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

STATELESS IN GAZA

Since July 2004, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has faced its most serious internal challenge since it was established in 1994. A violent showdown in the Gaza Strip between competing nationalist factions-an "old guard" and a "young guard"-has threatened to destroy the PA and, with it, what little remains of domestic security and order after four years of uprising against Israel. The ongoing turmoil represents a critical danger, not just for Palestinian society and its dreams of a unified state, but also for Israel's plan to disengage unilaterally from Gaza-a plan the United States is counting on to revive the peace process and to regain much-needed credibility in the Middle East.

If Israel implements Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's plan to withdraw from the Gaza Strip in the last quarter of 2005, Palestinian society will fragment even more, lose the benefit of unified representation, and very possibly lapse into bloody infighting. The Israelis will not get the security they want and will be forced to confront a Hamas empowered by the PA's collapse. Meanwhile, the Quartet-the United States, the UN, the European Union, and Russia-will find not only its "road map" to peace in tatters, but also that peacemaking is impossible without a strong, integrated Palestinian leadership. Continued Palestinian disarray thus affects all parties involved in the conflict. But it is not too late to change course: holding Palestinian national elections before Israel's withdrawal could prevent the chaos and help establish the foundations for a democratic Palestinian state committed to peaceful relations with Israel.

GENERATION GAP

Sharon's withdrawal plan has exacerbated long-rising tensions within the Palestinian political community. When the al Aqsa intifada erupted in September 2000, it triggered dramatic changes in the Palestinian social and political environment. Weakened by Israeli retaliations and plagued by corruption and inefficiency, the PA speedily lost legitimacy at home and abroad. With this slide in popularity came serious internal divisions within the nationalist camp, the PA's core; the resulting power vacuum opened the way for lawlessness and a rise in the authority of Hamas and other Islamists. Not only did paralysis at the top levels of decision-making plague Palestinian government, but it also blunted Palestinian efforts to build a state or make peace.

Capitalizing on Palestinians' growing fear and thirst for revenge, Islamist groups such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) gained public favor with suicide bombings and violence against Israelis. Average Palestinians were feeling more and more threatened by Israeli-imposed checkpoints, curfews, and sieges of Palestinian cities and towns; by the separation barrier being built deep in the West Bank; and by continued Israeli land confiscation and settlement construction. Public support for the Islamists shot up from 17 percent in mid-2000-just before the intifada began-to 35 percent in mid-2004.1 During the same period, support for Yasir Arafat's nationalist Fatah party, which dominates the PA, dropped from 37 percent to 28 percent. In the Gaza Strip, the gap between the two groups widened even more.

Like the Islamists, Fatah's young guard used the al Aqsa intifada to undermine the prevailing Palestinian political system as much as to undermine Israeli security. By emulating Hezbollah's methods, the young militants wanted to force Israel to withdraw unilaterally from the occupied territories as it had from southern Lebanon in May 2000. But resorting to violence against the Israelis also brought the young nationalists popular legitimacy, free rein to carry arms and form militias, and a chance to intensify their fight against the old guard. Meanwhile, the escalating attacks on Israel reduced the old guard's maneuvering room in its diplomatic contacts with Israel and the international community, further damaging the PA's credibility. To improve their position vis-à-vis their older rivals, young guard militants also sought an alliance with the Islamists, while siding with refugees and the inner-city poor against the wealthy and the urban commercial class. Empowering these disenfranchised groups helped sustain the intifada despite the tremendous costs the uprising exacted on the Palestinian middle class. As long as the intifada continued, the young guard grew stronger.

At the same time, popular support for Arafat and his old guard steadily declined. Arafat's lack of vision led many Palestinians to question his judgment and leadership. His popularity decreased from 47 percent before the intifada to 35 percent by the end of its third year. In late 2003 and 2004, his popularity rating occasionally hit about 50 percent, but only in response to Israeli threats to kill or expel him. Arafat's loss of control over the treasury-the result of increased scrutiny of PA finances by the international community-made it difficult for him to use money to secure his position. Those among the armed young guard who remained loyal to him began to grumble when he was unable to pay them regular salaries.

The Palestinian public became painfully aware of the widespread corruption in the PA and its security services and grew more frustrated than ever. A survey conducted in June 2004, one month before the eruption of the Gaza turmoil, found that 87 percent of Palestinians in the occupied territories believed corruption existed in the PA. Two-thirds felt that public officials involved in, or accused of, corruption often were not charged or brought to account for their actions. Some 92 percent backed internal and external calls for fundamental political reform of the PA-the highest level ever-whereas only 40 percent believed the PA was actually carrying out any such reforms.