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The Future of Palestine

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2004

Summary:  The current turmoil in the Gaza Strip represents the most serious challenge to Yasir Arafat's authority in decades. Israel's planned disengagement from Gaza brought to a boil long-simmering tensions among Palestinian factions demanding a change in the status quo. Holding national elections before the pullout may be the only way to avoid chaos and save any chance at Middle East peace.

Khalil Shikaki is Director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research in Ramallah.

[continued...]

Despite the militancy of almost all Palestinian factions during the intifada, elections will likely moderate Palestinian discourse on the peace process. Over the last decade, surveys of Palestinians have documented a clear trend toward moderation-such as accepting Israel's Jewish character and a Palestine limited to the occupied territories. Palestinians are more willing to compromise today than at any time since the start of the peace process in 1993. Polls also demonstrate that Palestinians who have hope for a better future-including fundamental political reform-tend to reject violence and support reconciliation with Israel; elections can help supply this kind of hope. True, the al Aqsa intifada has meant a rise in public support for radical Islamist groups such as Hamas, but polls also indicate something more surprising: although there are more supporters of Hamas today than in 2000, they are much less committed to the group's ideology; many are even open to a peace agreement that embraces a two-state solution.

Still, for elections to succeed, Israel and the international community will have to make sacrifices. Israel must respect the Palestinian cease-fire by observing a cease-fire of its own. Israel needs to remove physical impediments, such as checkpoints and its stifling military presence in populated areas, and suspend activities-settlement construction, targeted assassinations-that Palestinians view as provocative. If Israel refuses to take such steps, the demands for elections will weaken, another chance at reform will be lost, and Arafat will once again blame Israel for the Palestinians' continued misery.

The United States and other international actors must ensure that the Palestinians and Israel implement their election-related commitments. Regional and international monitors from bodies considered unbiased by the Palestinians, such as Japan, Russia, the EU, and the UN, will have to guarantee the validity of the elections-and strong political pressure will be needed to make sure they actually take place. Washington and the rest of the Quartet must also set a binding election date, as well as the length of the election period.

U.S. credibility is now so low in the Middle East that the White House will have to work behind the scenes. But as Israel's principal ally, its role will be crucial. Palestinian elections present the Bush administration with the opportunity to give concrete expression to its declared commitment to pursuing both Israeli-Palestinian peace and regional democracy. By supporting elections, and thus linking peace making to democracy building, the White House can begin to quell the suspicion pervasive among Arabs that its intervention in Middle Eastern politics is motivated solely by expediency and self-interest, rather than a sincere desire to initiate regionwide reform and good governance. Without changing this deep-seated belief, neither the United States nor its allies will ever truly defeat Islamist extremism.

1. Figures cited here are based on multiple surveys conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PCPSR) in Ramallah and supervised by the author. The surveys were conducted using face-to-face interviews in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including Arab East Jerusalem. The average sample size of each survey was about 1,320 adults. Details about the survey methodology are available at the PCPSR Web site (http://www.pcpsr.org).


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