Turkey's Dreams of Accession

David L. Phillips

From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004

Summary:  The hope of joining the EU has driven major reforms in Turkey, including economic liberalization, human rights protection, and greater civilian oversight of the military. But these reforms have fueled suspicions among Islamists and hard-line army officers. EU membership would help Turkey become a successful Muslim democracy, strengthen it as an ally in the fight against terrorism, and foster liberalization in the Islamic world.

David L. Phillips is a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Preventive Action at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Structural reforms have also been passed to curtail the NSC's powers. Although it will still comprise military officers and Turkey's four main commanders, the NSC has been enlarged to give civilian ministers a majority. The Law on the National Security Council has also been amended to prevent abuse of the NSC's advisory role, decrease the frequency of NSC meetings, and deprive the TGS of its authority to convene them. The prime minister is now authorized to appoint the NSC secretary-general, who sets the agenda and the tone of the council's work.

Still, some Turks believe that no matter how much the country reforms, the EU will ultimately reject a Muslim candidate. Christian Democrats in Europe, who are already uneasy about Muslim minorities in their home countries, argue that bringing Turkey into the union would mean importing problems from the Middle East. As a compromise, some EU states are exploring a third way of engaging with Ankara: something more than a partnership but less than accession. France has proposed granting Turkey "special status"; Germany's Christian Democrats have suggested a "privileged partnership," providing Turkey with free trade and closer integration in security and military affairs. But Turkey believes these would bring it few benefits that it does not already enjoy by participating in the EU Customs Union and NATO. Accusing recalcitrant EU states of applying double standards and shifting goalposts, Erdogan flatly rejects anything short of membership.

For Erdogan, the stakes of accession are very high. By bringing Turkey to the EU negotiation table, he would bind Turkey more closely to the West; he would also fulfill Atatürk's vision of Turkey as a modern European country while affirming the country's popular Islamic identity. Turkey's rejection by the EU could cause a domestic backlash against the West and embolden ultranationalists and religious extremists bent on derailing Turkey's liberalization, democratization, and demilitarization.

Erdogan's opponents within the AKP are waiting for him to falter. Although Erbakan's traditionalist Felicity Party currently enjoys little support, Turks could be tempted to turn to it if the AKP fails to reconcile their hopes for piety and progress. Yet Erdogan should not respond to these pressures by becoming more Islamist. If this were to happen, nationalists would then attack him for undermining Turkey's secular democracy. Turkey's armed forces have removed governments in the past; they could be tempted to engineer another coup.

Were the AKP to split, elections might be called, and Erdogan would then be under pressure from nationalists who favor the military's return to dominance in domestic affairs. In Turkish politics, power reverts to those who wait around long enough. In this case, the staunchly secular CHP would surely try to appeal to both nationalists and liberals, who are typically opposed to each other. In such early elections, the CHP's Deniz Baykal could emerge as the top vote-getter, form a coalition government excluding AKP factions, and allow the NSC to regain many of its powers.

Such a change of guard could seem superficially appealing to the Bush administration, which is deeply entrenched in its war against terrorism. Indeed, although the U.S. government officially supports Erdogan, some Pentagon officials are uneasy about his Islamic orientation. They believe that the Turkish armed forces are far more reliable than the AKP in fighting terrorism. But condoning a takeover by Turkish military hard-liners would backfire. If the United States appeared to waver in its support for democracy, widespread popular resentment would adversely affect the U.S.-Turkey strategic partnership.

Instead, Washington should use its influence to encourage EU members to set a date for starting accession negotiations with Ankara. As President George W. Bush affirmed at Galatasaray University on June 29, both U.S. and Turkish interests are served by continued reforms in Turkey. More than a political and economic union, the EU represents a community of values. If it agrees to start negotiations with Turkey, Turks will rally behind Erdogan and Ozkok, allowing them to consolidate democratic reforms. Turkey has already made great strides to meet the Copenhagen criteria, and its leadership must be encouraged to continue these efforts in preparation for the next EU summit. Turkey's accession to the EU is an unprecedented chance both for the country to fulfill its potential as a successful modern democracy in the Muslim world and for the West to strengthen a precious ally in the fight against terrorism, deepen its commitment to diversity, and foster liberalization in the Islamic world.