The Neglected Home Front

Stephen E. Flynn

From Foreign Affairs, September/October 2004

Summary:  The Bush administration has waged an aggressive war against terrorists abroad, but it has neglected to protect the homeland, even though Americans in the United States are the ones most vulnerable to future attacks. The government must do more to safeguard critical U.S. infrastructure and mobilize the American public to help. For starters, it should create a semi-independent federal agency tapping into private resources that would develop and enforce security standards.

Stephen E. Flynn is Senior Fellow in National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. This article draws from "America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us From Terrorism" (HarperCollins, 2004).

The FSRS's national board of governors would play an oversight role in establishing prevention and response guidelines and monitoring compliance with security mandates within the water, food, chemical, energy, financial, information, transportation, emergency response, and public health sectors. Its responsibilities would include issuing regulations to carry out major federal laws governing the security of these sectors. Members of the board would be available to meet with the president's homeland security advisers and to testify before Congress. The board would submit an annual report to Congress on the state of security within each sector, along with a national vulnerability assessment. The board would also have a role in international bodies, such as the International Standards Organization and the World Trade Organization, in advancing universal security standards for critical networks that span international boundaries. For technical and scientific support, the board should establish a formal relationship with the congressionally chartered National Academy of Sciences.

Each of the ten Homeland Security Districts should be given lead responsibility for a specific critical sector, based on its relative importance within their jurisdiction. For example, the district for the northeastern region of the country might be assigned the lead on financial security. The district assigned primary responsibility for a sector would chair a committee made up of representatives from the remaining districts. In addition, the primary district would be responsible for hosting an international advisory committee that would include private-and public-sector experts from Europe, Canada, Mexico, Japan, and other allies of the United States.

The district board of directors would be made up of private-sector leaders representing each of the critical infrastructure sectors; a labor union representative; officials from the public health, public safety, and nongovernmental sectors; a designated civil liberty advocate; and media leaders. The federal regional director from the Department of Homeland Security would be a vice chair with one U.S. attorney from within the district, who would provide a formal link with the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Department of Defense's Northern Command, which has responsibility for protecting U.S. territory from armed attacks, would be allowed a nonvoting, ex officio seat on the board.

The districts would all be assigned support staffs whose composition would be divided between full-time public-sector employees and industry experts nominated by the private sector. These industry experts would be given a two-year leave of absence by their employers to support their work at the district level. As in the Federal Reserve, these private-sector appointments would be highly selective opportunities for talented midlevel executives to better understand and help inform the policy environment that will affect their respective sectors. All of the private participants would be provided with government security clearances.

At the metropolitan level, the FSRS could be tied into an expanded version of the post-September 11 Anti-Terrorism Advisory Committees and Joint Terrorism Task Forces that are run by DOJ and the FBI. Currently these groups are made up of representatives from federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. They are essentially forums in which cops can talk with cops. Under the FSRS, these organizations would be set up in all states and within the major metropolitan areas and should include private-sector representatives who have received background checks and been issued the appropriate security clearances.

The Metropolitan Anti-Terrorism Committees should serve as a forum for sharing the latest threat assessment information with local and private entities that have direct operational oversight over critical sectors. They would also be charged with reviewing vulnerability assessments and security plans, including conducting exercises to evaluate prevention and protection efforts on the ground. Additionally, the teams would be given responsibility periodically to inspect compliance with security regulations in the same way that federal bank examiners are sent out periodically to assess the operations of their member banks. When serious discrepancies are found, the district board could impose sanctions.

The Federal Reserve describes itself as a system that is "independent within the government." This means it must work within the overall objectives established by Congress, but its decisions do not have to be ratified by the president or anyone else in the executive branch. This level of independence is justified as both a check on executive power and as a way to manage the risk that decisions directly affecting the operation of the marketplace might become dangerously politicized. The case for a similar approach to homeland security is compelling. In both instances, the goal is to better align commercial interests with public interests.

The overall thrust of this proposed FSRS is to create a participatory system that does not unrealistically rely on the activities of federal agencies. By using the Federal Reserve as a template for enlisting expertise beyond Washington, the United States can achieve a middle ground between placing the fate of critical networks entirely in the hands of overworked federal authorities and relying on a laissez-faire approach that provides no protection.

This, admittedly, is an ambitious proposal. But now is not a time for timidity. Nor is it a time for persisting with an outmoded national security framework, designed for a different enemy in a century gone by. Americans must demand that their government put in place the kind of structure that widens the breadth and quality of civic participation in making the United States safe. And the entire nation, not just the national security establishment, must be organized for the long, deadly struggle against terrorism.