Don't Break the Engagement

Elizabeth Economy

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2004

Summary:  This election year may tempt both critics of the Bush administration and hard-liners within it to attack U.S. policy on China. That would be a mistake, however, for engaging Beijing has worked well. Economic growth in China has spurred political liberalization, legal reform, opening of the media, and popular activism. The Bush administration -- and those who aspire to replace it -- should not let electoral tactics jeopardize sound policy. With respect to China, that means staying the course.

Elizabeth Economy is C.V. Starr Senior Fellow and Director of Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China's Future.

KEEPING ON COURSE

Although China's leaders seem clearly resolved to continue down the path of reform, much about their strategy remains uncertain. Hu and Wen are careful when they talk about the future of reform in China. Hu has said that he will pursue political reform "unswervingly, actively, and cautiously." In an interview with "The Washington Post" last November, Wen pledged to develop democracy, protect human rights, and improve China's legal system. But he rejected any plan to reform the country's one-party system on the grounds that, because of its vast and poorly educated population, China should not rush its political overhaul.

Chinese intellectuals are also divided over what is the most desirable or likely course for reforming the country. The political analyst Liu Junning has argued that political reform will naturally spring from more market reform and greater economic freedoms. Pan Wei, an associate professor of political science at Beijing University and a government adviser, advocates a system insulating the state from the CCP's influence and codifying freedom of speech, assembly, and press. But he argues that China is "not ready" to become a multiparty democracy and that "democratizing the country without the basis of a clear and stable social or class division would lead to a Hobbesian war of all against all, not the stable partisan politics of the Western democracies." More ambitious thinkers, such as the constitutional lawyer Cao Siyuan, have laid out a detailed road map to representative multiparty democracy, with regular and competitive elections and a U.S.-style system of checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. But even Cao advocates caution. He favors gradually weaning the CCP from its position as sole ruling party, by changing its name to the Socialist Party of China, separating it from the state, and allowing it to accept private donations.

Nor does China have a clear model of democratization to emulate. Hong Kong and Taiwan may seem like obvious examples, but their politics are too unsettled to provide much guidance. Twice last year, people in Hong Kong marched en masse: to signal their autonomy from Beijing and to reject a proposed antisubversion law. In Taiwan, President Chen Shui-bian pushed through the legislature a constitutional amendment enabling popular referendums. At first, Beijing warned Taipei not to go too far, and it sent teams of experts to advise the Hong Kong government on the constitutionality of the demonstrators' demands. But more recently, it has taken a tougher line. Beijing's equivocating may be a sign that it is becoming increasingly uncomfortable dealing with these wayward elements as it struggles to accommodate its own on the mainland.

Meanwhile, although Beijing has already done much to promote the types of changes Washington has advocated, much more remains to be done -- and the reforms underway could stall before China becomes a full-fledged, multiparty democracy. U.S. engagement helped bring economic development and political liberalization to South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, but only after decades of sustained efforts. So too should Washington remain actively -- and patiently -- involved with Beijing, for two reasons: because engagement has worked, and because more of it is still needed. Election politics in the United States should not distract policymakers from the very real benefits that policy has already produced.

The United States can best help foster reform in China by being sensitive to both the opportunities and the limitations of its influence. It must first get a firm grasp of how China is or is not changing -- and how it is most likely to change in the future. A better understanding of China's current reforms will help the United States create a propitious environment for more progress down the road.

Conversely, shortsightedness will jeopardize opportunities. Take, for example, Washington's efforts to change China's penal system. To correct long-standing abuses -- appalling living conditions in labor camps, torture in prisons, and high execution rates -- the United States has repeatedly pressured China to submit to inspections by the UN special rapporteur on torture, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Although such inspections help call attention to the worst abuses, their effect may be limited or even counterproductive, if they are not handled with great diplomacy. A different approach, based on a better understanding of organic developments inside China, might be more effective. For example, the United States could use as starting points the discussions about labor camp reform and review of the death penalty process that have grown in China over the past year. It could engage its experts in those local discussions, helping China to modify its practices on its own terms first. In time, perhaps, that might convince Beijing to institutionalize the type of wholesale, systemic reform that the international community wants.

Engagement, in other words, requires diligence. The U.S. government should reassess the way it reports on and analyzes China's reform progress. The State Department issues annual reports detailing China's record on human rights and religious freedom; these reports identify current human rights problems but say little about how China's behavior is changing. Three- to five-year progress reports that track significant changes in the status of dissidents and broader changes in the legal system, Internet usage, and the nature of reform debates would be useful complements. The Congressional-Executive Commission on China, for example, publishes expert testimony that represents broad perspectives on China's HIV/AIDS policy, environmental protection, religious freedom, and compliance with World Trade Organization standards, and it identifies trends in each.

China's extraordinary integration into the international economy has made it increasingly responsive to pressure from abroad and has brought the interests of various Chinese constituencies in line with international interests in political transparency, legal reform, and human rights protection. International outcry was in good part responsible for convincing China to shift from a policy of denial to one of transparency over the SARS epidemic last year, but partly because the medical profession, media, and top government officials in China were also advocating a more open approach. And it was the combined effect of agitation by Chinese NGOs and pressure and incentives from the international community that recently broke China's reluctance to acknowledge the severity of its AIDS pandemic. As China strives to become a beneficent regional power and a global player, international attention will continue to influence its domestic policies. International economic integration has already prompted political liberalization in China. The United States need only stay engaged to push that progress along.