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How to Build a Fence

From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004

Article preview: first 500 of 4,887 words total.

Summary:  Israelis and Palestinians must be separated for the Middle East to achieve some semblance of peace. At this point, that will take a fence. The good news is that Israel is already building a sensible barrier. The bad news is that the Sharon government may construct it in a way that spurs future conflict rather than ends it. The United States thus needs to step in to make sure that the right kind of fence gets built, in the right place--or else both sides will face more fighting in the future.

David Makovsky is Senior Fellow and Director of the Project on the Middle East Peace Process at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and an adjunct lecturer at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies. This article is based on the forthcoming study, The Defensible Fence: Fighting Terror and Enabling a Two-State Solution, by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

PARTITION WITHOUT PARTNERSHIP

The idea of a fence separating Israelis and Palestinians is, on one level, an admission of failure. Yet it is also realistic: with little trust between the two sides and a history of bitterness and bloodshed, a negotiated partition is out of reach (at least for the foreseeable future). Israel's decision to build a "separation barrier," therefore, makes sense, given that a majority of both Israelis and Palestinians favor a two-state solution that includes an Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank -- but they don't know how to make this happen. Israelis do not trust the Palestinian Authority (PA) to fulfill its security obligations and halt terrorist attacks, and Palestinians remain convinced that Israel will never voluntarily cede the West Bank and Gaza.

A properly constructed fence could cut through these problems and facilitate a final agreement. A poorly constructed barrier, however, would impede such an end. The United States should therefore back a version of the fence that boosts Israeli security without unduly hurting the Palestinians or foreclosing a future return to diplomacy. Washington should also support vigorous, innovative moves to minimize whatever Palestinian suffering even a legitimate fence would cause. And the United States must oppose Israeli fence plans that focus more on politics than on security.

A properly constructed fence could achieve multiple objectives: reduce violence by limiting the infiltration of suicide bombers into Israel, short-circuit the deadlock on achieving a two-state solution, advance the debate in Israel about the future of most settlements, and perhaps even provide an incentive for Palestinians to return to the negotiating table. Even without negotiation, the fence would function as a provisional border and could be modified in the future if Palestinians make real progress in halting terrorism against Israel and agree to restart talks.

The good news, moreover, is that a fair, workable fence is already being built by Israel's Ministry of Defense. Projected to stand largely on the western side of the West Bank, this fence will potentially leave 85 percent of the West Bank to the Palestinians -- not radically less than the 95 percent proposed by Bill Clinton at the end of his presidency. If the Palestinians assume their security responsibilities in the territory from which Israel withdraws, this land could become part of the state of Palestine in fairly short order. Already, the construction of this fence has helped spur responsible political discussions in Israel, and a full-blown debate is now underway on the futility of retaining remote settlements in the West Bank. Even Ehud Olmert, the usually hawkish Likud cabinet minister, has declared that Israel should evacuate all settlements east of the new divide.

The bad news, however, is that Prime Minister Ariel Sharon has not ruled out a more restrictive and invasive version of the security fence, one that would carve up the West Bank into Palestinian cantons. A major battle within the Likud over where the fence should run is just beginning. Territorial maximalists are pushing hard for an ...

End of preview: first 500 of 4,887 words total.

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