Trouble in TaiwanFrom Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004 Article ToolsSummary: George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that may lie ahead. Michael D. Swaine is Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [continued...]Critics of the one-China policy are also wrong to suggest that support for democracy in Taiwan obligates the United States to endorse the formation of an independent and sovereign nation-state. On the contrary, democracy will continue to thrive only if unilateral strides toward independence are rejected, because moves to alter the status quo would probably result in a devastating conflict on the island. U.S. strategic, political, and moral interests are thus best served by a policy that seeks not only to deter the use of military force but also to ensure that reunification between Taiwan and China remains an option. At present, the most immediate threat to such a policy is presented by the actions of President Chen. Upon taking office in 2000, Chen pledged that he would avoid taking unambiguous steps toward independence -- including holding referendums that affect Taiwan's sovereign status -- as long as China did not intend to attack Taiwan. Now, claiming that such an intention exists, Chen wants to hold a national referendum on Taiwan's presidential election day, March 20, ostensibly to gauge the public's views of China's missile deployments and "use of force." To justify this move, Chen has invoked a recently passed law that permits the president to call "defensive" referendums in response to dire threats against Taiwan's national security. Yet China's buildup of missiles and the country's refusal to renounce the possible use of force to prevent Taiwanese independence are not new threats. They have been a major element of the cross-strait imbroglio for many years and do not constitute clear evidence that Beijing actually intends to attack the island. As indicated above, China's posturing reflects Beijing's deterrence calculus and is an expression of its claim to sovereign authority over Taiwan. There is no doubt that the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens would express concern about Chinese saber-rattling if asked. But this begs the question, If the popular response is so predictable, why hold a referendum at all? Chen is using the referendum to bolster his standing with Taiwan's voters and, perhaps even more important, may use it to create for himself a handy excuse for disregarding his original pledge not to alter the status quo. If the referendum passes, Chen could claim that the Taiwanese public has confirmed China's intention to attack the island and thereby could justify further moves toward independence. His next step would most likely be to enact an entirely new constitution via a second national plebiscite (as opposed to revising or amending the existing constitution). Such a move would sever any legal or procedural continuity with Taiwan's existing political system. Most important, it would negate the past source of Taiwanese sovereignty, which, according to the existing constitution, resides with the people of "China." Although this provision may seem fictional, it has proved highly useful, indirectly helping to preserve the peace for more than 50 years. Redefining the source of state legitimacy as belonging to the citizens of Taiwan alone would almost certainly persuade a large number of Taiwanese that "one China" no longer exists and that Taiwan is a separate sovereign state. Although such a self-definition would not be tantamount to independence, China would perceive it as precluding the possibility of reunification, which would greatly increase the chances of a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan. Washington is thus fully justified in discouraging Chen from holding a referendum, as part of its broader effort to establish the conditions underlying its political and military support to the island. The current leadership must be disabused of the notion that the United States will defend the island under any circumstances. Such a policy would be entirely morally justified, would in no way threaten Taiwan's democracy, and -- most important -- would best protect U.S. interests. On the Chinese side, Washington must seek both to deter China militarily and to assure Beijing that the reunification option remains on the table. To these ends, President Bush's recent policy shift is a step in the right direction.
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