Trouble in TaiwanFrom Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004 Article ToolsSummary: George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that may lie ahead. Michael D. Swaine is Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. [continued...]DEMOCRATIC MYTHS Taiwan has been free to prosper and develop a vibrant democracy largely thanks to an understanding reached during the normalization of U.S.-China diplomacy in the 1970s. At that time, China pledged that it would seek a peaceful solution to the Taiwan issue in exchange for a U.S. commitment not to challenge (and, by implication, not to undermine) the one-China position. The Taiwanese government concurred that it understood the island to be part of China. But Taiwan's recent emergence as a democracy has cast doubt on -- if not eliminated altogether -- that commitment. The political influence of the Chinese nationalist minority on the island has waned, in favor of a growing separatist-leaning Taiwanese leadership. It is imperative that the United States not follow Taiwan's lead in pressing for a unilateral change in the status quo. Given the high risks involved, the original understanding achieved between the United States and China should be adjusted only as a result of negotiations between the two powers, rather than through unilateral actions undertaken by either side or by Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan's democratization and the consequent "Taiwanization" of the island's political system do not automatically justify the unilateral abandonment of the United States' original pledge. Furthermore, the U.S. government must not assume that Taiwan's citizens are uniformly committed to achieving full and permanent independence from China. Public opinion polls over the past decade have consistently shown that most Taiwanese people oppose any abrupt movement toward either independence or reunification. Moreover, a highly reputable recent study indicates that older Taiwanese citizens (who experienced the sometimes brutal rule of the Chinese nationalists) are more likely to view themselves as purely Taiwanese than their younger counterparts. Many of the latter identify themselves with both Taiwan and China, thus suggesting that Taiwan's population might become less inclined toward formal independence in the future. Overall, a clear majority recognizes the value of remaining pragmatic and open-minded about the future, acknowledging China's stance toward Taiwan, Beijing's growing military capabilities, and the enormous benefits that accrue to Taiwan as a result of deepening economic and social contact with the Chinese mainland. That said, most of Taiwan's citizens do not want to be ruled by the current Chinese regime and would prefer a greater level of international recognition as a nation. The Taiwanese people's national aspirations -- and their willingness to undertake risks in achieving those aspirations -- are heavily influenced by the cues they receive from their political leaders, as well as the actions, or inaction, of the United States and China. In short, Taiwan's leaders significantly shape, and do not merely reflect, the island's sense of self-identity and its population's moves toward self-determination. For this reason, the United States must carefully evaluate the behavior of Taiwan's leaders and not shirk from shaping it in ways that support U.S. interests. As part of this process, the United States must dispel the assumption -- held by conservatives in the United States and pro-independence politicians in Taiwan -- that a people's expression of self-determination is tantamount to actual territorial sovereignty. Neither the United States nor the international community has ever validated the notion that the majority views of a given people, whether expressed through democratic processes (such as a referendum) or other means, justify an inherent right to independence. Territories such as Chechnya, Kashmir, Kosovo, and Tibet are not recognized by the international community as independent states, despite the fact that a majority of their inhabitants would likely support independence. Rather, recognition of a people's status as a nation-state is conferred by the international community and is highly subject to the calculations and interests of the most influential powers involved. By this standard, Taiwan is not currently an independent nation, since the vast majority of the international community -- including the United States -- does not accept it as such. THE GREATEST GOOD Moral imperatives to intervene in international relations emerge only when another entity, usually a government, inflicts grave harm on innocent people. Genocide, ethnic cleansing, mass rape, and slaughter are examples of morally repugnant activities that warrant such interventions. Other deprivations may also be sufficient for the international community to act: economic enslavement, systemic state-imposed poverty, or denial of political rights and liberties, for example. These types of maltreatment do not typically lead other nations to initiate war, but they may prompt concerted political and economic pressure on the injuring state. Taiwan suffers none of these injuries. Its people are not being killed, ethnically cleansed, or raped by China. And it enjoys economic liberty and growing prosperity under freely elected democratic rule. The main limitation that China imposes on Taiwan is against its establishing de jure independence, as distinct from the de facto independence it currently enjoys. This hardship is regrettable, but no reasonable standard of international morality requires the United States to risk military intervention to redress it. From a moral standpoint, Washington's top priority should be to avoid precipitating war across the Taiwan Strait, a situation that would inflict incomparably greater suffering on the island than would continuing its de facto autonomy.
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