Trouble in Taiwan

Michael D. Swaine

From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2004

Summary:  George W. Bush was right to rebuke Taiwan's president over his plans for a referendum on relations with China. Administration critics assume that democracy and independence are inseparable, that the "one China" principle is no longer useful, and that China would never go to war over Taiwan. But they are wrong on all three counts and fail to appreciate the dangers that may lie ahead.

Michael D. Swaine is Senior Associate and Co-Director of the China Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Moreover, the maintenance of cooperative, if not necessarily amicable, relations with the Chinese government is critical to U.S. regional and global objectives. These objectives include preserving a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Asia; resolving the North Korean nuclear weapons crisis; maintaining peace between India and Pakistan; advancing the United States' ever-burgeoning economic interests in China; strengthening enforcement of international nonproliferation regimes; and prosecuting the war on terrorism.

A war with China over Taiwan would, of course, be far more dangerous than any of the United States' post-Cold War operations. Although not a match for the United States, China is nonetheless a continental power with very large conventional ground, naval, and air forces, as well as a nuclear weapons arsenal capable of reaching any target in the United States and beyond. Taiwan's proximity to China, the difficulty involved in interdicting Chinese attacks without directly striking the Chinese mainland, and the historical inclination of both sides to display resolve in a crisis through decisive -- and sometimes rapid -- military action suggest that escalation might prove extremely difficult to control.

None of this is intended to imply that Taiwan is not worth supporting or defending. In fact, the island is of considerable importance to the United States for at least three reasons. First, Washington's policies toward Taipei directly affect the credibility of U.S. commitments to other potentially destabilizing regional or global issues. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan is closely tied to U.S. interests in nurturing newly established democracies, especially those that are threatened by authoritarian governments. And third, it is always important to demonstrate loyalty to long-time friends.

It is a mistake, however, to think that safeguarding these interests and warding off a confrontation with China are mutually incompatible goals. That would be true only if Beijing were clearly and irrevocably committed to employing force against Taiwan, which is not the case. Rather, China's deployment of military forces along the Taiwan Strait is intended to deter Taiwan and the United States from closing off the option of eventual reunification. The chances of a confrontation between Beijing and Washington, in other words, could be reduced further if China's leaders believed that the option of ultimate reunification remained on the table for the foreseeable future. Any such judgment is directly related to U.S. policy toward Taiwan. Not only can the United States decisively affect Taiwan's behavior, but determined U.S. support for an independent Taiwan could eventually elicit the backing of the majority of the international community. Thus U.S. policymakers must not ignore or downplay Chinese views. In particular, Washington must reassure the Chinese that their worst fear -- independence for Taiwan -- will not be realized without their consent.

CARROTS AND STICKS

At the same time, however, the United States must avoid giving Taiwan the impression that it will permit China to coerce the island into submission. This would undermine the United States' credibility and its support for democracy. Even worse, it might convince Taiwan to seek alternatives to U.S. military support, perhaps even raising the specter of nuclear deterrence. The United States should also attempt to convince China's leaders that they must soften their stance toward Taiwan and make China more attractive to Taiwanese citizens. The best way to do this would be to encourage democratization in China via greater social and economic contact and sustained efforts to promote the rule of law. Any unilateral attempt to compel China to drop essential elements of its long-standing policy -- such as the one-China principle or the use of force -- would simply alarm Beijing and could result in unnecessary conflict.

Military and diplomatic deterrence, balanced by an adequate level of reassurance, is also essential to the maintenance of stability. Under existing conditions, words alone will not convince Beijing that force is irrelevant or too dangerous to employ in an effort to avoid losing the island. The Chinese leadership continues to fear that the United States might eventually support the permanent separation of Taiwan from China. Washington must therefore minimize the risk of China's miscalculating its interests, by keeping the stakes of a first military move by Beijing extremely high. This requires a consistent and energetic reiteration by the United States that it will not tolerate any attempt by Beijing to coerce Taiwan into submission. It also requires the creation and maintenance of a credible military deterrent by both the United States and Taiwan.

Taipei, in particular, must develop a genuine ability to defend itself against possible Chinese attacks, including a rapid decapitation strike timed to occur before any U.S. assistance can arrive on the scene. There is considerable evidence that China is seeking to acquire the ability to launch just such a strike. Unfortunately, Taiwan is unable to credibly deter or deflect a Chinese attack (especially a rapid strike) at present, despite greatly increased levels of U.S. assistance. Indeed, it appears that many Taiwanese political and military leaders incorrectly believe that the island does not need to acquire such capabilities and can rely on the United States entirely.

Ultimately, the extent to which the United States and Taiwan must rely on deterrence is inversely related to the success of Washington's efforts to reassure China that it is committed to the status quo. As President Bush has recognized, such efforts are likely to be more successful if greater levels of trust can be created through the establishment of a stronger, more cooperative, Sino-American relationship. They are likely to be less successful if the relationship is allowed to deteriorate through insufficient attention to each other's interests. Chinese officials will be less bellicose and more patient if they believe Washington is not colluding with Taipei to favor independence. Insufficient reassurance -- even if it is combined with a strong deterrence posture -- could eventually provoke China into a desperate use of force, in the belief that Washington might use its superior military capabilities to protect Taiwan from a Chinese attack as the island moved toward independence. Efforts to strengthen deterrence, in other words, must be carefully coordinated with a larger strategy of reassurance if stability is to be maintained.