Kenya After Moi

Joel D. Barkan

From Foreign Affairs, January/February 2004

Summary:  Kenya's fragile government is threatened by factionalism, economic challenges, and rising crime. To ensure Nairobi's involvement in the war on terrorism, Washington must be sensitive to its domestic needs, recognizing that fledgling democracies can be more difficult to engage than their authoritarian predecessors.

Joel D. Barkan is Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa. From 1992 to 1993, he was the U.S. Agency for International Development's governance adviser to Kenya.

This powerful group is close to Kibaki but intellectually out of touch with younger Kikuyu professionals and businessmen -- most of whom are 15 to 30 years their junior -- and with other younger members of Kenya's middle class. Most of the younger cohort does not want a return to Kikuyu hegemony, because they appreciate the resentment this caused under Kenyatta. They also worry that the people around Kibaki cannot provide the leadership required to modernize the economy and make Kenya competitive in regional and world markets. People who share such concerns make up the second political faction. Its most prominent member is Kiraitu Murungi, minister of justice and constitutional affairs. Its priorities include combating corruption, enacting judicial reform, and ensuring truth and reconciliation.

The third faction is led by Odinga, the former LDP leader, and includes more than 20 members of the National Assembly. Odinga was offered the new post of prime minister under the pact that created NARC. But whether Kibaki and his supporters will honor this pledge is a matter of growing contention. Given Odinga's barely concealed ambition to lead Kenya one day, the old guard and the faction around Murungi are reluctant to support the new post. This perceived backtracking, coupled with an unequal distribution of ministerial posts between NAK and LDP officials, has led to a simmering dispute between the first two factions and the third.

The fourth faction includes independent leaders from both the NAK and LDP sides of NARC who command significant local followings, including Vice-President Moody Awori. It is the main force for moderation and cooperation within the coalition.

All four factions of NARC hold ministerial positions in an unwieldy cabinet of 24 members, deliberately enlarged to house all. Their divergent perspectives and constant bickering, combined with Kibaki's laissez-faire approach, have limited the government's ability to deal with the major challenges facing Kenya today. As a consequence, Kibaki now faces a dilemma: should he continue to muddle through with his present team or reshuffle and downsize the cabinet by sacking its more rebellious members -- particularly Odinga -- and the less effective performers?

The most likely scenario is the first. Notwithstanding their differences, the most prominent members of all four factions would rather remain in the government than return to the opposition. All leaders are committed to making the government work, even if this means little more than running their respective ministries effectively. Furthermore, no one faction or combination of factions is sufficiently strong to expel another without seriously weakening the government.

But there are still grounds for concern. NARC's postelection honeymoon is fast nearing its end. And although the government remains popular, largely because Moi is gone, professionals and business leaders are increasingly disappointed with its performance.

MAKING KENYA WORK

Broadly speaking, four major challenges remain. The first is to reform Kenyan governance. This means not just bringing in competent people to run the government at the top, but also changing the civil service from the bottom up. Kenya's civil servants currently number 190,000 (excluding teachers), roughly 20 percent more than the country needs. Most of these are poorly paid, which encourages corruption. A comprehensive policy of pay reform has yet to be implemented, but any significant raise will increase the government's wage bill, which already stands at 9 percent of GDP. This is one of the highest levels in Africa and is unsustainable given current government revenues. The solution to this quandary will be painful: pay reform must be linked to retrenchment in the civil service. But the government has resisted this step so far, largely because of the lack of private-sector employment opportunities.

The government's ability to enact civil service reforms has been hampered by NARC's lack of experience. Few ministers have had prior government service. Before the elections, most were professionals, backbench members of the National Assembly, or activists, not managers. The new team has also been highly suspicious of civil servants, given the pervasive cronyism under Moi, resulting in mutual distrust at the heart of government. Morale problems have been compounded by Kibaki's decision to replace or rotate all permanent secretaries and other senior officers. Many civil servants remain fearful of being swept away by the new broom, further undermining the basis for reform.