Should Hezbollah Be Next?

Daniel Byman

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003

Summary:  The radical Lebanese Shi'ite movement Hezbollah is fomenting violence in post-war Iraq and fanning the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bloody track record makes it a natural target in the war on terror. But Washington's only option is to confront Hezbollah indirectly: by getting its backers, Syria and Iran, to help change its focus from militancy to politics.

Daniel Byman is an Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Limited strikes would be similarly unlikely to succeed. After all, Hezbollah fought a successful guerrilla war against Israel for 15 years. Israeli forces killed or kidnapped large numbers of commanders and combatants, but Hezbollah was able to regenerate its leadership and find new recruits. And any strike against Hezbollah would likely increase its popularity. The pre-September 11 campaigns against al Qaeda are instructive: the 1998 U.S. bombings in Afghanistan and Sudan not only failed to kill al Qaeda leaders, but also lionized the movement in the eyes of the local population and the Arab world.

Nonetheless, Hezbollah too has good reason to want to avoid such a conflict. Although the movement gained popularity for its successful resistance -- and remains fundamentally a militant movement -- any further confrontation with the United States or Israel that subjected southern Lebanon once again to the ravages of war would be highly unpopular even among Hezbollah's supporters. However, in the event of a direct U.S. attack, the group's gloves would come off. Ayatollah Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, often referred to as Hezbollah's spiritual leader, has told his followers to confront "American interests everywhere" if the United States cracks down.

Ultimately, the biggest difference between the struggle against al Qaeda in Afghanistan and a potential war on Hezbollah is that the United States' current position in the world -- militarily and diplomatically -- is far less favorable than it was at the start of the war on terror. The U.S. military was overstretched even before September 11; now, there are almost 150,000 U.S. troops stationed in Iraq and smaller forces deployed in Afghanistan, the Balkans, Yemen, Djibouti, the Philippines, and elsewhere. Hopes for a quick withdrawal from Iraq are no longer feasible, and U.S. special operations forces -- critical in counterterrorism operations -- are particularly strained.

The United States would have a difficult time finding allies for a strike on Hezbollah. Al Qaeda declared war on everyone: secular Western regimes, Arab autocracies, and a range of governments in between. Such undiscriminating zealotry made international cooperation against al Qaeda relatively easy to obtain. In contrast, Hezbollah is widely viewed as a legitimate, and even admirable, resistance movement fighting an oppressive regional hegemon. Many regimes in the region see the group as a cause deserving support, not a threat to their rule. Even some government officials in Europe and Asia see Hezbollah as more of a social movement than a terrorist organization. In October 2002, Hezbollah operatives participated in a Francophone summit in Beirut with implicit French endorsement.

The war in Iraq has exposed the United States to charges of arrogance from its friends and imperialism from its enemies. The failure to uncover a robust weapons of mass destruction program has hurt U.S. credibility, making it difficult to justify another war. A new military struggle would confirm perceptions of the United States as a trigger-happy cowboy.

CONFRONTATION BY PROXY

The best strategy against Hezbollah is to confront it indirectly: by putting pressure on Iran and, more important, on Syria. Secretary of State Colin Powell has tried a similar tactic with the Lebanese government, but Beirut is essentially Damascus' puppet and will take no independent action. In the past, Israel has tried military action to force Lebanon to act, but the result has been destruction and a refugee crisis with no change in the government's stance. Moreover, it is unlikely that Beirut could confront Hezbollah even if it wanted to. Although approximately 7,000 Lebanese government troops are stationed along the Israeli-Lebanese border, Hezbollah forces could easily defeat them.

Constant diplomatic and economic pressure on Tehran and Damascus, on the other hand, coupled with the implicit threat of military action, can successfully rein in Hezbollah. Demanding that its backers abandon it outright would fail, but a more limited approach focused on putting a stop to violent activity would have a good chance of success. The United States should repeatedly emphasize that Syria and Iran will be held responsible for Hezbollah's actions.

Although Iran exercises tremendous influence over Hezbollah, it lacks the means to force a significant change in the movement and its goals. It has no real presence on the ground in Lebanon, and a call to disarm or cease resistance would likely cause Hezbollah's leadership, or at least its most militant elements, simply to sever ties with Tehran's leadership. Indeed, Iran may find that it has been too successful in imparting its ideology: Hezbollah is more loyal to the legacy of the Islamic revolution than are most Iranians. The United States could, however, convince Tehran to end its support of Hezbollah's violence without walking away from the movement altogether. Iranian President Muhammad Khatami recently told a crowd in Beirut that Hezbollah should act cautiously, and experts have argued that the U.S. victory in Iraq and domestic strife in Iran will compel Iranian leaders to seek better relations with Washington. For the right price -- or from fear of a very harsh response -- Tehran might begin to emphasize Hezbollah's humanitarian and political projects over its guerrilla and terrorist operations.