Should Hezbollah Be Next?

Daniel Byman

From Foreign Affairs, November/December 2003

Summary:  The radical Lebanese Shi'ite movement Hezbollah is fomenting violence in post-war Iraq and fanning the flames of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Its bloody track record makes it a natural target in the war on terror. But Washington's only option is to confront Hezbollah indirectly: by getting its backers, Syria and Iran, to help change its focus from militancy to politics.

Daniel Byman is an Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University and a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Hezbollah today is dramatically different from the ragtag collection of Shi'ite fighters that first emerged in the early 1980s. In 1982, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, Israel invaded Lebanon in an effort to expel Palestinian guerrillas there. The Shi'ites, traditionally underrepresented in Lebanese politics, welcomed the Israelis, whom they saw as protection against the Palestinian militias that dominated much of southern Lebanon. Israel overstayed its welcome, however, and the Shi'ite community soon turned against it. As the situation unraveled, the United States deployed peacekeepers to Beirut and worked to form a new government. Although the Amal movement, until that time the leading voice of the Shi'ite community, embraced the U.S.- and Israeli-backed regime, much of its constituency rejected this cooperation and denounced the government as a puppet of Israel. Syria and Iran encouraged such dissent; Iran hoped to export its Islamic revolution to Lebanon, and both Syria and Iran sought to use the Shi'ites as a proxy force against Israel. With support from Damascus, Tehran helped organize, arm, train, inspire, and unite various Shi'ite groups into the movement that became known as Hezbollah -- "party of God."

The organization literally exploded into the world's consciousness with devastating suicide attacks on the U.S. embassy and marine barracks in Beirut, causing over 250 American casualties. As a result, Washington concluded that there was little peace to keep in Lebanon and withdrew its forces in 1984. Israel suffered similar blows, fighting a long, bitter struggle against relatively autonomous fighters who became more and more effective over time. Faced with ferocious Hezbollah resistance, Israel withdrew to a "security zone" in southern Lebanon in 1985 and, 15 years later, left Lebanon altogether.

In Hezbollah's struggle to expel Israel from Lebanon in the 1990s, much of its activity vis-à-vis Israel was best characterized as guerrilla warfare rather than terrorism. The vast majority of Hezbollah's actions were focused on Israeli military personnel on Lebanese soil and intended to drive Israel out of the country. At times, however, Hezbollah did target civilians, through operations such as Katyusha rocket attacks on Israeli settlements near the border and the attacks in Argentina. Hezbollah's supporters argue that such strikes occurred only after Israel violated "red lines" or escalated tensions by assassinating Hezbollah leaders.

Both Hezbollah's terrorist actions and its guerrilla warfare are facilitated by the group's extensive international network. Hezbollah operatives have been found in France, Spain, Cyprus, Singapore, the "triborder" region of South America, and the Philippines, as well as in more familiar operational theaters in Europe and the Middle East. The movement draws on these cells to raise money, prepare the logistic infrastructure for attacks, disseminate propaganda, and otherwise ensure that the organization remains robust and ready to strike. In 2001, U.S. federal investigators discovered a Hezbollah fundraising cell in North Carolina.

Hezbollah's founding document calls for Islamic rule in Lebanon, an end to Western imperialism, and the destruction of the state of Israel. But the group has now abandoned these founding principles, at least in practice. Hezbollah leaders participate in Lebanon's political system, and some have rejected the forceful imposition of Islam. Hezbollah still denounces the United States, but it has become much more cautious in its opposition. It has not been involved in an attack on a U.S. target since the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, when it assisted others rather than using its own capability.

Direct attacks on Israel have also become rare since the withdrawal from southern Lebanon. This decrease, however, is not a sign that the movement has accepted Israel's existence. Rather, Hezbollah has shifted to helping Palestinian terrorist groups become more lethal -- exporting what journalist James Kitfield has labeled "the Hezbollah model" to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Hezbollah has proved the single most effective adversary Israel has ever faced. Its fighters and leaders have demonstrated exceptional dedication and an ability to learn from mistakes and innovate quickly. Palestinians regularly cite Hezbollah's combination of skilled operations, willing sacrifice, and emphasis on long-term struggle as a guide to their own efforts. And even militias affiliated with Yasir Arafat's secular Palestinian faction Fatah have followed Hezbollah's example, resorting to the sort of suicide terror that had heretofore been the province of Palestinian Islamists. Since the outbreak of the al Aqsa intifada in October 2000, Hezbollah has provided guerrilla training, bomb-building expertise, propaganda, and tactical tips to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other anti-Israeli groups. There are also reports that Hezbollah is trying to establish its own Palestinian proxy, the Return Brigades. Such support for Palestinian terrorists has helped disrupt the peace process at little cost to Hezbollah itself.

Exporting its model of conflict while limiting actual attacks allows the movement to continue its fight without alienating its Lebanese constituents (many of whom fear an Israeli backlash) or its backers in Tehran and Damascus (who fear U.S. retaliation). Ominously, Iraq may become the site of Hezbollah's newest proxy war. In May, Nasrallah called for supporting "the oppressed" when they are "occupied," an attempt to equate the U.S. presence in Iraq with Israel's occupation of southern Lebanon. He has thus far avoided openly urging foreign volunteers to enter Iraq, but the postwar chaos has clearly provided fertile ground for Hezbollah's expansion. Many of the movement's founders studied in seminaries in Iraq, and Lebanese Shi'ites maintain ties with their Iraqi brethren. The relative disorganization of Iraqi Shi'ites provides an opportunity for Hezbollah to gain a foothold there, and much of the Arab world would support Hezbollah action against "the American invader." For the United States, active Hezbollah support of Iraqi insurgents would have disastrous consequences.

LEGITIMACY AND POWER

Addressing Hezbollah's involvement with terror is complicated by the support it enjoys in the region and the legitimacy it enjoys in Lebanon. At home, Hezbollah is as much a social and political organization as it is a terrorist or guerrilla movement; abroad, its violence serves the interests of Tehran and Damascus, both of which helped create it and still actively back it. It is embedded in Lebanese politics and society and, unlike al Qaeda, is a stakeholder in the existing regional order, not a force bent on destroying it. This position has made Hezbollah stronger but has also forced it to become more cautious, cunning, and subtle.