The Last of the Patriarchs

Aluf Benn

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002

Summary:  Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon faces disaster on two fronts: ongoing unrest from the Palestinians on one side and a disintegrating domestic coalition on the other. Seemingly paralyzed, Sharon has not responded well to either. So far, Israelis have remained mostly loyal to the former general, and Washington has stayed largely supportive. Both those situations could change, however, unless Sharon comes up with a plan. He may already have one in mind, but not one anyone else is hoping for.

Aluf Benn is Diplomatic Correspondent for Ha'aretz, an Israeli daily newspaper. He has covered Israel's foreign policy and the Arab-Israeli peace process since 1993.

In many ways, however, Abdullah's formula accepts certain truths that the current intifada has made clear for both sides. Israel will never agree to the return of Palestinian refugees to Israel proper. And the Palestinians will likewise refuse Israel's demand to keep its settlements in the West Bank. Before the outbreak of the current intifada and even during its early stages, both sides seemed somewhat flexible on these issues. But no longer, and Abdullah's plan has the virtue of recognizing that fact.

From Sharon's perspective, however, the prince's initiative is fraught with dangers. The prime minister may attempt to spin it for his domestic audience, arguing that because he stood firm in the face of violence and refused to make concessions under fire, Israel has received a better offer from the Arabs than ever before. But if Sharon rejects the proposal, the Arabs will use it as a reverse Camp David -- arguing before the world that this time it was Israel, not Arafat, who rejected a reasonable offer.

Sharon also risks losing ground at home. If the Arab League formally endorses the plan, including its promise of normalized relations, it could serve as a rallying point for the Israeli left -- something Labor has lacked ever since the election. This could cause Sharon's coalition to collapse and lead to a groundswell of support for a final-status agreement.

Knowing the risks, Sharon has so far treated the Saudi proposal with characteristic caution. He initially tried to buy time, asking for "clarifications" and hinting at a possible positive reaction. Most likely, however, he will try to treat the Saudi initiative as he treated the Mitchell report, killing it softly, through inattention and foot-dragging.

What we can expect from Jerusalem, then, is more of the same. Sharon will keep trying to win this war of attrition by military means and will try to avoid substantive negotiations unless and until the Palestinians surrender. Knowing that American backing is essential, Sharon will do all he can -- including avoiding excessive escalation -- to keep Washington on board.

Given that neither Israel nor the Palestinians show signs of imminent collapse, the two adversaries are likely to continue bleeding each other for the near future. As Palestinian attacks escalate, Sharon will face growing pressure to reconquer the territories and rid them of terrorists. Such operations, however, as have recently occurred in Jenin, Balata, and Ramallah are bound to be costly in Israeli, not just Palestinian, blood. And Israel has no clear exit strategy for ending a prolonged reoccupation.

The one factor that might change this scenario is an American operation to remove Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq. Such an initiative could vary Sharon's fate in a few ways. Washington, anxious for Saudi and Egyptian support, may push Sharon into making compromises and starting peace talks -- perhaps on the basis of the Saudi proposal. On the other hand, if Arafat repeats his 1991 folly and once again sides with Saddam, Sharon might finally seize the chance to get rid of his enemy.

The Persian Gulf War put an end to the first intifada and led Israelis and Arabs into Oslo. A second round could have a similar outcome. If, however, Israel gets hit by the ricochets -- Iraqi missiles in retaliation for American bombing, for example -- the attack could work to Sharon's advantage. Even anticipating such an event, Israelis could well decide to reelect their oldest, most experienced leader.

The fact that Sharon has survived this long demonstrates his remarkable capacity for maintaining a broad coalition under pressure. But his domestic challenges remain very serious. The heavy escalation of violence in late February and early March, combined with his slide in the polls, led Sharon to tilt first to the right, as when he called on Israel to "cause many Palestinian casualties," and then to the left, as when he abandoned his demand for seven days of quiet and ended Arafat's virtual house arrest. Such zigzags have caused the first serious rifts in Sharon's coalition; the recent defection of an extreme right-wing party has made the prime minister even more vulnerable to domestic pressure.

Already, Sharon's political adversaries smell his weakness. Ben Eliezer has called for an early election in November, a year before Sharon's term expires. Although Sharon need not agree, Labor could then defect from the government. Sharon might then cobble together a narrow right-wing coalition, but such an alliance would make it extremely difficult to actually govern.