The Last of the Patriarchs

Aluf Benn

From Foreign Affairs, May/June 2002

Summary:  Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon faces disaster on two fronts: ongoing unrest from the Palestinians on one side and a disintegrating domestic coalition on the other. Seemingly paralyzed, Sharon has not responded well to either. So far, Israelis have remained mostly loyal to the former general, and Washington has stayed largely supportive. Both those situations could change, however, unless Sharon comes up with a plan. He may already have one in mind, but not one anyone else is hoping for.

Aluf Benn is Diplomatic Correspondent for Ha'aretz, an Israeli daily newspaper. He has covered Israel's foreign policy and the Arab-Israeli peace process since 1993.

The most common question asked about Sharon today is a simple one: Does he know what he's doing? As events spiral from bad to worse, anxious observers at home and abroad wonder if the prime minister actually has a plan for solving the crisis, or if he is simply trying to buy time and survive.

It is no small irony that this question is being asked about Ariel Sharon, of all people. In contrast to most Israeli politicians, who tend to blur their political positions as they climb the ladder to power, Sharon has clung to a narrow ideology for years. And indeed, the short answer to the current question is yes: he does have a plan of sorts, although it does not include the sort of final-status agreement that Palestinians have in mind.

At the core of Sharon's vision lies his map, which he sees as essential to Israel's future security. Under Sharon's plan, Israel would maintain two West Bank "security zones" under its direct control. The wider zone in the east would provide security against invasion (most likely by Iraq) and serve as a buffer between the Palestinian state and Jordan. Sharon once subscribed to the "Jordan is Palestine" school -- rooted in the idea that Israel's neighbor, the population of which is already mostly Palestinian, should be the basis of any future Palestinian homeland. In recent years, however, Sharon has changed his mind and now recognizes that an independent (that is, Hashemite) Jordan remains important to regional stability.

Sharon's second envisioned security zone would lie in the western foothills of the Samarian mountains, along the old 1967 border that divided Israel from the West Bank (then ruled by Jordan). This western buffer would "widen the narrow waist" of Israel and allow it to control the underground aquifer beneath it, which supplies drinking water to Israel proper. Current Israeli settlements in the territories would remain in place -- after all, they were planted there (many of them by Sharon himself) for security reasons in the first place.

According to Sharon's plan, the Palestinians would get control over everything between the two security zones -- albeit with severe restrictions on their sovereignty. Israel would control Palestine's borders with Jordan and Egypt, as well as its airspace and two or three "lateral roads" connecting the two zones. The new state would be demilitarized, banned from joining military pacts, and committed to cooperating with Israel against terrorism. To ensure the contiguity of their state, Sharon would give the Palestinians some additional land and build a system of tunnels and bridges. He would also support rapid economic development in Gaza and the West Bank, which he believes is necessary to reduce Palestinian militancy and national ambitions. Development projects, including a joint Israeli-Palestinian water desalination plant, would be underwritten by international investment. Finally, Sharon's plan calls for "education for peace" in both societies.

Sharon has publicly sketched out these ideas at various times, packaging them as a "long-term interim agreement," an "armistice agreement," or simply a "non-belligerency" pact. As he sees it, only after this plan had been in place a long while (seven years, according to Palestinians who have met with him; Sharon denies having supplied this figure), and only after a "table of expectations" had been fulfilled, would both sides negotiate a final settlement. Thus Sharon has opposed any attempt -- including the various new plans now being floated -- to move up these ultimate negotiations. As his February 20 speech to the nation and earlier statements suggest, what Sharon really wants is to freeze the status quo -- with some symbolic and economic benefits offered to the Palestinians.

DEAF EARS

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Sharon has recently discovered that although his plan may sound good to him, no Palestinians are interested in it, even as a basis for negotiations -- at least not without a firm Israeli commitment to move quickly into final-status talks. Sharon may feel that the Palestinians would be better off cutting a deal with him than with a potential successor, since he enjoys strong support in Israel and therefore could actually sell a plan to the Knesset and the public. And he has duly presented his ideas to American and other foreign leaders. But so far the Palestinians have not shown much interest, and Arafat has refused to even consider Sharon's offer.

Since both sides have refused to give ground, Sharon has been unable to initiate negotiations. Instead, he has been left to manage the current war on a day-to-day basis, thus giving the impression that he has no clear strategy for ending it.

In the absence of signs that Sharon can break the deadlock, various theories have arisen to explain his apparent inaction. Critics on the left argue that the former general has not changed since his days as the belligerent architect of the Lebanon war. They argue that his real strategy is to destroy the last remnants of the Oslo peace process, do away with Arafat, and dismantle the PA into smaller "cantons" run by local leaders heavily dependent on Israel. And indeed, Israel's recent blows to the symbols of Arafat's rule -- such as the Palestinian airport or the PA's broadcasting facilities -- have humiliated Arafat and eroded his power, thus giving credence to this theory. So has the fact that Sharon has encouraged his regional military commanders to hold talks with their Palestinian counterparts on a local level.