Sudan's Perfect War

Randolph Martin

From Foreign Affairs, March/April 2002

Summary:  After years as a pariah, Khartoum has now deftly managed to end its political isolation. The success of its new alliances and the completion of an oil pipeline, however, mean that northern Sudan could indefinitely continue its bloody civil war against the south. Only the United States has the power and prestige to help end the violence and push for a peace that would be in everyone's interests.

Randolph Martin is Senior Director of Operations at the International Rescue Committee. He has travelled extensively throughout Sudan over the last 20 years and lived there from 1985 to 1989.

BORN INTO BLOODSHED

War has raged in Sudan for all but 11 of the 45 years since its independence. The most recent round of fighting began in 1983, after then President Ja`far Muhammad Numayri revoked the autonomy that had been granted to the country's south 11 years before and imposed Islamic law (the shari`a) throughout the land. These steps were the final insult to the predominantly non-Muslim, non-Arab population of southern Sudan, which had long been cut off from the distribution of national resources and otherwise marginalized.

At first, it was John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that took up the south's fight against government forces. But in the 19 years of bloodshed since, Sudan's civil war has been carried on by four different northern regimes and countless southern alliances. With two million fatalities so far, this war has produced more casualties than those in Angola, Bosnia, Chechnya, Kosovo, Liberia, the Persian Gulf, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Rwanda put together. An astounding four million Sudanese -- out of a population of around 29 million -- have been made homeless. Yet militarily, the fighting has accomplished little. Today the government controls only key garrison towns in the south; the rest of the region is ruled by the SPLM or one of the many other factions that have evolved over the years.

Meanwhile, rather than moving the conflict closer to resolution, political and economic developments in Sudan over the last few years have made achieving a negotiated and just peace even more unlikely. Through deft maneuvering, Khartoum has consolidated its power and ended the international isolation from which it suffered for years. And it has cleverly engineered the war so that today, few of the combatants actually hail from the north. Furthermore, with the construction of a pipeline, oil extracted from the south is now earning Sudan's government well over a million dollars a day -- enough to pay for the military campaign and buy new friends abroad. From the north's perspective, therefore, the battle against the south has become self-sustaining, both politically and economically. It has become, in essence, a perfect war.

Only one power has much hope of breaking through this deadlock: the United States. Throughout the 1990s, Washington supported the southern insurgents while isolating the northern government in the hope that Khartoum would eventually fall. This policy was justified by reference to the Sudanese government's habit of violating the human rights of its citizens, its destabilization of the region, and its support for international terrorism. But Washington's approach did little to end the fighting.

In the last few years, however, the Sudanese government has made substantial improvements on the latter two complaints, and, to an extent, also on the first. As a result, progressive engagement by Washington should now supplant the old policy of isolation. The world's sole superpower is uniquely situated to engage Sudan as a firm but fair broker, pushing for a resolution to the decades-long conflict. Furthermore, there are signs that Khartoum is eager to normalize its relations with Washington -- if for no other reason than to lift trade sanctions and gain U.S. favor in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Although Sudan is unlikely to backslide into its behavior from the bad old days if the United States remains reticent, it is also clear that, without American intervention, the war in the south may continue indefinitely.

ENTER THE MULLAHS

Since 1989, Sudan has been ruled by Umar al-Bashir, a general who seized power after toppling the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi. At first, al-Bashir's government seemed destined for disaster, as it implemented a number of draconian measures restricting life in Sudan both socially and economically. Possession of foreign currency was made illegal, curfews were imposed, and warehouses of goods belonging to private businesses were seized in a war against hoarding.

Having thus alienated both democrats and Sudan's merchant class, al-Bashir relied for support on the Islamists, forging an alliance with Hassan al-Turabi's fundamentalist National Islamic Front (NIF). In Sudan's last election, in 1986, the NIF had won a pathetic 6 percent of the vote. Nonetheless, after al-Bashir's coup the party suddenly found itself in power, and the NIF wasted little time putting its repressive stamp on the country. Implementation of the shari`a -- which had been scheduled to be rescinded on the day that al-Bashir seized control -- was redoubled. Public floggings and amputations (including "cross-amputation," the cutting off of the right hand and left foot) returned to the stadium in Khartoum. Osama bin Laden was welcomed into the country, and Sudan strengthened its ties with Iran, Iraq (which it supported in the Persian Gulf War), and Libya -- all countries that provided material and moral support for Sudan's war against the south.

At first, al-Bashir enjoyed some popular support from pockets of the Islamic right and others in the country who were frustrated with the fits and starts of the al-Mahdi government. What little popularity the new regime amassed soon eroded, however, as the government's policies sank Sudan deeper into financial destitution, political turmoil, and international isolation.