The Fallout from Kosovo

Peter W. Rodman

From Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999

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Summary:  NATO began its air war against Yugoslavia with high hopes that the transatlantic relationship would find new purpose through robust humanitarian intervention. Alas, Milosevic remains as entrenched as ever. A messy diplomatic compromise is increasingly likely, but anything less than total victory will have grave consequences for America and its allies. Europe will be wary of cooperating with the United States on security and balk at future engagements that lack U.N. blessing. U.S. isolationists will get plenty more grist for their mill. With its expectations set far too high, NATO will pay the price when they come crashing back to earth.

Peter W. Rodman, a former White House and State Department official, is Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center and author of the recent monograph Drifting Apart? Trends in U.S.-European Relations.

COLLATERAL DAMAGE

Contrary to many fears, Kosovo did not ruin the North Atlantic Alliance's 50th anniversary celebration in Washington last April after all. On the contrary, the solidarity that all the allies felt compelled to demonstrate amid the crisis may have helped them paper over their numerous differences over NATO's mission and procedures in a new era. The summit's agreement on an updated "Strategic Concept" for the alliance was a significant achievement. But anything less than success in the Kosovo crisis will undermine this unity -- an outcome that now seems likely.

The allies began the war with high expectations. The center-left governments in office in key allied countries stressed the moral imperatives of reversing ethnic cleansing and saving the people of Kosovo. Under attack from political forces on the far left (and, in France, from the right) for collaborating with the hated Americans, these leaders have defended their solidarity with NATO through moral argument. The war must "prevent a humanitarian catastrophe," German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder insisted. But if the crisis ends in an ambiguous diplomatic compromise with Slobodan Milosevic, the disillusionment may be sharp and the political reverberations intense. NATO's unity of purpose in entering the war will not preclude transatlantic finger-pointing and recriminations if the outcome does not live up to the high standard that was set. The strategic stake for the alliance has become enormous.

Through most of the Kosovo war, the alliance has shown an impressive solidarity. Occasional displays of weakness by individual allies -- such as the impatient Greek and Italian pleas for a "bombing pause" after the very first night of bombing and a similar German overture three weeks later -- have been quickly squelched. Confidence in the prospects of success seemed to vindicate the alliance and its U.S. leadership. Nato was demonstrating its relevance and effectiveness in the new era by combating ethnic violence in Europe. No other institution -- neither the United Nations, nor the European Union (EU), nor the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe -- was capable of military heavy lifting. A success in Kosovo (an even more difficult case than Bosnia) would guarantee the primacy of NATO in Europe's future. There would be no doubt that NATO was the preeminent and indispensable security institution on the continent. The controversy over whether a U.N. Security Council mandate was needed for such nondefensive NATO interventions (which the United States opposed) seemed virtually settled. The Kosovo precedent validated an exception for "humanitarian catastrophes," perhaps hinting of future unconstrained NATO action in other, more geopolitical emergencies.

In short, the transatlantic mood was good. Both Europeans and Americans seemed to have relearned the lesson that they could not achieve important objectives in Europe without each other. Even French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine fended off criticism from leftists and Gaullists alike by insisting that, in this crisis, "one must not argue in terms of competition between Europe and the United States." There was "remarkable" cooperation between Europe and America over Kosovo, he added ...

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