Defense's Death Spiral: The Increasing Irrelevance of More Spending

John Hillen

From Foreign Affairs, July/August 1999

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Summary:  The military's backward budget process -- driven by parochial service interests rather than White House or Pentagon priorities -- must be fixed, and soon.

John Hillen is a contributing editor at National Review and editor of the recent book Future Visions for U.S. Defense Policy.

The most striking feature of this year's defense budget debate was that there was none. One reason for the absence of the usual acrimony accompanying the authorization of billions of federal dollars was congressional exhaustion from the impeachment proceedings. Another and more important reason was that the military's problems -- the "three Rs" of readiness, recruiting, and retention -- were well reported. President Clinton could not afford to be caught cutting defense dollars while bombing Iraq and Kosovo. The administration's unease with traditional defense-cutting arguments has spread across both aisles on Capitol Hill, where almost any vote on three-R spending is treated as a litmus test for patriotism. Thus in February, after only one day of debate, the Senate voted 91-8 for a military pay raise that by itself could amount to $55 billion over ten years. The House of Representatives, which could not even pass a resolution supporting the air war in Kosovo, voted overwhelmingly for a $13.1 billion emergency military spending bill only days later.

Hawks should find President Clinton's proposed $112 billion increase in military spending over the next six years cause for celebration. The armed forces have simultaneously been downsized and run ragged by an unprecedented number of protracted overseas deployments. The Pentagon has managed thus far by robbing funds intended for future programs and equipment, but even that tactic has lost its useful life. With combat readiness near a 20-year low, morale suffering, and acquisition sorely underfunded, the military could use the cash.

Even hawks should be troubled, however. The defense budget crisis that forced the president's hand did not happen by accident. True, top generals and admirals downplayed their readiness woes until they were too obvious to hide and then sprang them on Congress when the government surplus became evident, giving the crisis a sudden and random character. The capricious winds of budgets and strategies had apparently collided to the Pentagon's disadvantage. But the truth is that the groundwork for the military's budget crisis was laid long in advance and was fully predictable. And the same system that gave us this defense "train wreck" will suck up and waste even more substantial increases in military spending for the foreseeable future unless Washington makes significant changes.

The Pentagon is locked in a budgetary death spiral simply because the way it thinks about the world has not caught up with the way it spends money. The process is the problem. The military programs, strategies, and weapon systems funded by the $270 billion annual defense budget match neither the administration's national security strategy nor the Pentagon's own blueprint for future military operations.

THE BLURRED VISION THING

Since its inception in 1947, the Pentagon has existed as a loose confederation of the armed services. The Army, Navy (which also budgets for the Marine Corps), and Air Force are obligated to recruit, train, equip, and organize their own forces. For this they receive around 85 percent of the Pentagon budget in seemingly fixed (and fairly equal) proportions, together ...

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