The Politics of Paralysis II: Peace Now or Hamas Later

Khalil Shikaki

From Foreign Affairs, July/August 1998

Summary:  Yasir Arafat and his loyalists have been the backbone of Palestinian support for the Oslo peace process, but Arafat will not live forever. Already, the corruption and repressive practices of his Palestinian Authority have sapped support for Oslo. His Islamist foes will not remain on the sidelines. Palestinian society's traditionalism makes the fundamentalists of Hamas the only credible alternative to Arafat's center, and they feed off frustration over Israeli intransigence. If the diplomatic deadlock, graft, and illiberalism continue after Arafat, Hamas could well take over.

Khalil Shikaki is a Professor of Political Science at an-Najah National University in Nablus and Director of the Center for Palestine Research and Studies.

PALESTINIANS HAVE REACHED THEIR LIMITS

Since the election of Binyamin Netanyahu in 1996, mutual trust and confidence between Yasir Arafat's Palestinian Authority (pa) and Israel's new Likud government have steadily deteriorated. That vicious cycle will only be exacerbated as the two sides harden their positions in preparation for the final status talks. These negotiations touch on both Israelis' and Palestinians' most critical issues of security and national survival: refugees, Palestinian statehood, security arrangements, settlements, and, thorniest of all, Jerusalem.

The erosion of the Oslo process gives new importance to Palestinian politics. Palestinian public opinion will determine Arafat and the pa's room for maneuver in the run-up to May 1999 -- the deadline for the conclusion of the final status talks and, if those negotiations fail, Arafat's avowed date for unilaterally declaring Palestinian statehood. So far, al-Fatah, Arafat's mainstream, secular nationalist movement, has provided the backbone of the peace process. Its support has held despite the setbacks. But Fatah's success is based on two key factors: Arafat's leadership and a lack of initiative by the Islamist opposition. As the grand old man of Palestinian nationalism, Arafat's personal influence and political wiles have let him dominate and change Palestinian politics in a way no other figure could. But Arafat will not live forever, and Hamas will not stay on the sidelines forever. If the peace process flags, Arafat falls, and Hamas rises, the nationalist center could indeed lose its hold on power to the Islamists. Palestinian politics, increasingly, are the front line of the peace process.

A POLITICIZED SOCIETY

Palestinians, like their Israeli neighbors, are highly politicized. The 1993 Oslo Accords -- which call for an end to terrorism, mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the creation of the pa, and deferral of the remaining issues to the final status talks -- have increased the importance for peace of Palestinian views. Pundits often make sweeping generalizations about belligerent Palestinian attitudes without bothering to offer evidence of any sort. But since 1993 Palestinian public opinion has been surveyed regularly and extensively, and can be quite accurately gauged.

There are three major political forces in Palestinian politics and society today: the mainstream nationalist center, a leftist nationalist opposition, and an Islamist opposition. Ideologically, the mainstream nationalists, led by Arafat and Fatah, the dominant faction of the plo, are semi-secular pragmatists who place some emphasis on traditional values. The center says little about personal behavior, but it rejects political Islam and embraces some democratic values. It seeks to establish a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza through the Oslo peace process. In demographic terms, supporters of the mainstream are disproportionately likely to be young, male, and less educated.

The national opposition, composed of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), is more leftist, secular, and socially liberal, but wary of liberal democracy and capitalism. Of the three groups, it has consistently had the least support. The leftists accept the notion of a Palestinian-Israeli peace based on a two-state solution, but they do not support Oslo and refuse to participate in the negotiations. To highlight their opposition to the peace process, the DFLP and PFLP boycotted the January 1996 national elections in the West Bank and Gaza. Supporters of the left are disproportionately well educated and are also often young.

Support for the peace process and opposition to violence is associated with educational level, age, and political affiliation. The well educated and supporters of opposition groups tend to be less supportive of Oslo and more supportive of terror. Palestinian students, like most other Arab students, tend to be more radical, defending ideals rather than compromises. To be sure, a general lack of responsibilities influences student thinking about the peace process. But more important, students' perceptions of Oslo are colored by the way they perceive their own governments. Most students see the peace process as an American tool to stabilize Arafat's corrupt regime and maintain the domestic status quo. The more disillusioned the students are with the pa about issues like corruption, mismanagement, and lack of democratization, the more opposed to the peace process they become.

The third force, the Islamists of Hamas and Islamic Jihad, focus on personal behavior, embrace the values of political Islam, and seek to establish an Islamic state. They emphasize traditional values, including veiling women and limiting their political role, but are not totally opposed to some liberal and democratic values. The Islamists oppose the peace process, refusing to acknowledge the legitimacy of Israel. They have no consistent demographic characteristic, even though disproportionately more support for them is found among illiterates and the most educated youth. The nonaffiliated are likely to be older, female, better-educated West Bank residents.

The universities aside, Palestinian society remains deeply traditional. But religion cuts different ways for the Palestinians. Those who pray daily are as likely to support the secular nationalists of Fatah as they are to support Hamas. But the Islamists have more support among those who oppose women's participation in politics and less support among feminists. Support for Hamas increases significantly among those who strongly oppose reinterpreting Islamic law to make it applicable to conditions of contemporary life, while support for the mainstream and the left increases among those who seek a more modern form of Islam. While Fatah has done well at appropriating some religious symbolism, the bottom line is that Palestinian traditionalism provides a deep wellspring of support for Hamas.