Defense in an Age of HopeFrom Foreign Affairs, November/December 1996 Article preview: first 500 of 5,304 words total. Article ToolsSummary: Twice before, America had the opportunity to make the prevention of conflict its first line of defense. It must not lose this moment after the Cold War to foment a revolution in security strategy. Preventing proliferation is key, and U.S. programs help turn Soviet missile sites into sunflower fields. The American armed services, the world's most emulated, show other militaries how to function in a civil society and conduct exchanges that head off misunderstandings. In Europe, George Marshall's fondest hopes are being realized through the Partnership for Peace, which reverberates well beyond the security realm. Meanwhile, the United States leverages forces for maximum deterrence and invests in smart technology. But its best investment is in openness and trust, the essential tools of the art of peace. William J. Perry is Secretary of Defense. PREVENT, DETER, DEFEAT Ralph Waldo Emerson noted that in times of revolution, "the energies of all men are searched by fear and by hope." We are living in such an age of revolution. Our hopes are stimulated by the success of democracy around the globe since the end of the Cold War, the growth of new trade relationships, and the expansion of communications worldwide. Our fears are stimulated by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic hatreds that rip states asunder, terrorism by extremist groups, and regional aggression by rogue nations. The stark contrast between these hopes and fears makes clear that this new era is characterized by humankind's increased capacity for both good and evil. This in turn makes clear that in addition to revolutions in politics, economics, and technology, there must also be a revolution in our thinking about security strategy. The United States, as the world's sole superpower, militarily and economically, must lead the way. During the Cold War, the threat of nuclear holocaust hung over our heads like a dark cloud, the West prepared to meet an armored assault in Central Europe, and proxy wars flared all over the world. These daunting threats have gone away, but they have been replaced by new dangers. Nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists who -- unlike the nuclear powers during the Cold War -- might not be deterred by the threat of retaliation. In Central and Eastern Europe, the difficult transition to democracy and market economies could lead to civil wars or even the reemergence of totalitarian regimes hostile to the West. Around the world, an explosion of local and regional conflicts, often rooted in deep-seated ethnic and religious hatreds, brings suffering to tens of millions. These conflicts do not directly threaten the survival of the United States, but they can threaten American allies and vital interests, particularly if the regional aggressors possess weapons of mass destruction. These new dangers make protecting America's security a different and in some ways more complex task than it was during the Cold War. Then, the United States structured its forces to deter a global war with the Soviet Union. All other threats, including regional ones, were considered lesser-but-included cases, and the United States assumed that its forces were capable of handling them. Today, while global conflict is far less likely, the danger of regional conflict is neither lesser nor included and must be taken explicitly into account in structuring U.S. forces. In the post-Cold War security environment, U.S. strategy for managing conflict rests on three basic lines of defense. The first line of defense is to prevent threats from emerging; the second is to deter threats that do emerge; and the third, if prevention and deterrence fail, is to defeat the threat using military force. Like the Cold War strategy of deterrence, the strategy of prevent-deter-defeat relies on close cooperation with American friends and allies. PREVENTIVE DEFENSE Today the United States has a unique ... End of preview: first 500 of 5,304 words total. |
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