Egyptian-Israeli Relations Turn SourFrom Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995 Article preview: first 500 of 3,221 words total. Article ToolsSummary: Israel and Egypt's cold peace has turned arctic. Jerusalem and Cairo are clashing over nuclear disarmament, other Arab states' ties to Israel, the stability of the Mubarak regime, and the peace process. The strains stem from Israel's and Egypt's competing visions of a new Middle East, which they both hope to lead. With U.S.-Egyptian relations also on the rocks, these tensions threaten the entire Middle East peace process. Fawaz A. Gerges, who spent January in Egypt, is a Visiting Fellow at the Center of International Studies, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, and a faculty member at Sarah Lawrence College. He is the author of The Superpowers and the Middle East:Regional and International Politics. A COLD PEACE GETS ARCTIC Far more threatening to the Middle East peace process than the increase in bloody attacks by Islamic militants against Israelis are the recent strains in Egyptian?Israeli relations. For the last five months, notwithstanding the diplomatic niceties of their regular meetings, the Egyptian and Israeli leaderships have clashed publicly over a wide range of issues that have brought the two countries to the brink of crisis. The verbal war reveals deep insecurity, suspicion, and hostility. This dramatic turn of events raises disturbing questions not only about the future direction of Egyptian?Israeli relations but also about the long?term viability of the peace process itself. The main point of contention is the character and composition of the new Middle East order and the roles of Egypt and Israel in it. Their competing visions struggle to shape the region's dynamics in their own images. Israel hopes to construct a new regional order that is Middle Eastern instead of Arab, in which Israel would be the dominant economic power. Thus, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres recently called for expanding the Arab League's membership to include Israel and other non?Arab Middle Eastern states. Since the signing of their peace accord with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1993, the Israelis have pursued active economic diplomacy to lift the Arab economic boycott against Israel and establish links with various Arab states. Israel's campaign has led to important breakthroughs with Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, and several Persian Gulf countries. The Arab boycott is being quietly and unceremoniously buried. Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Peres, and other ministers, leading a large team of Israeli businessmen at a major economic conference last October in Casablanca, Morocco, impressed on their Arab counterparts the mutual benefits of economic collaboration, promising high financial returns and incentives. But Peres, according to the Egyptian press, went further, poking fun at Egypt's failing political and economic record: "Egypt led the Arabs for 40 years and brought them to the abyss; you will see the region's economic situation improve when Israel takes the reins of leadership in the Middle East." Peres' statement poured fuel on simmering Egyptian fears. Israeli actions and words confirmed Egyptian suspicions that Israel aims to dominate the area at the expense of Egypt's regional role. To an Egyptian leadership already beleaguered by a rising tide of Islamic extremism, the marginalization of Egypt in the Arab arena would do intolerable harm to the internal stability of the regime. Historically, Egypt has led the Arab interstate system, and Egyptian leaders have used their investment in Arab affairs to legitimize their power at home and obtain external assistance. For example, former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's pursuit of pan?Arab unity was designed to make Egypt a power to be reckoned with on the local and international stage. Likewise, the alliance that his successor, Anwar al?Sadat, forged with Saudi Arabia and Syria enabled him to go to war against Israel in 1973, thus salvaging his reputation and presidency. Sadat's signing of ... End of preview: first 500 of 3,221 words total. |
|
| Copyright 2002-2008 by the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All Rights Reserved. Privacy Policy | Contact Us | FAQs | Webmaster | |