Russia Turns the Corner

Stephen Sestanovich

From Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994

Summary:  Despite apparent anarchy, Russia is passing three important tests for establishing a democracy. The military is acquiescing in the new democratic order, the old managers of the economy are losing their political grip, and the new regime has come to embody patriotism and legitimacy in the mind of the populace. A fledgling Russian republic may succeed where the Weimar Republic failed.

Stephen Sestanovich is Director of Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Another of Yeltsin?s deputies has gone still further in trying to appropriate nationalist themes. At the start of the fall campaign, Sergei Shakhrai, expounding the goals of his new party, known as the Party of Russian Unity and Accord, said that an alternative name for the group might be the "All-Russian Conservative Party"--dedicated to preserving the family, traditional morality and so forth. This might be dismissed as simple slogan-mongering but for one fact: in the Russian reformist vocabulary of the past few years, the word "conservative" has been virtually synonymous with "Stalinist." That it can now be dusted off and used without embarrassment by leading democrats like Shakhrai suggests the ongoing normalization of Russian politics.

PATRIOTISM AND THE RUSSIAN PERIPHERY

In its public rhetoric, the Yeltsin government is effectively protecting its patriotic credentials. It has been decisively helped over the past year by the mistakes of the so-called red-brown coalition. Communists and fascists grossly misread the popular mood (which is one of worry, not fanaticism), and by resorting to violence they demonstrated that their brand of patriotism is a formula for civil war.

Yet Yeltsin and his colleagues have had to contend with more than rhetorical challenges on the patriotism front. In the past year Russia has begun to face the practical difficulties involved in creating viable postimperial relations with the other former Soviet states. At issue here is a problem far more complex than whether, as Western commentators like to ask, the Russians "accept" the sovereign independence of their new neighbors or want the empire back. For Russian policymakers, the real question is whether the new democratic regime can deal effectively with the problems created for it by the breakup of the U.S.S.R.

If over the next several years these problems seem manageable--close economic ties are restored, no new security threats appear, Russian minorities feel safe--then there is not likely to be any serious revanchist movement in Russia; only extremists will demand the restoration of the Soviet Union?s old borders. If, by contrast, the former Soviet states represent a continuing source of turmoil and threats to Russia?s own well-being, then there will be a consensus that the country should act to protect itself. Liberals, moreover, will join this consensus. They are not prepared to be advocates of national weakness or chaos.

For now, however, there is no consensus, only ambivalence. The mixed feelings toward all former Soviet states was aptly captured by the columnist who described the dualism of public opinion toward Russia?s southern neighbors:

On the one hand, the consciousness of the average citizen is warmed by the thought that "[the Central Asian nations] will not be able to do without us after all." On the other hand, quite often angry exclamations are heard: "Our people are hungry themselves, and these have to be fed too."4

From deeply ambivalent views come deeply ambivalent policies. Responding to the first half of this sentiment--the half that desires some sort of reintegration with the former Soviet states--the government in the past year negotiated an agreement with them on a Russia-dominated economic union and ruble zone, involved Russia more deeply in ethnic conflicts in Tajikistan and Georgia, coaxed Azerbaijan into the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and offered continued energy subsidies to Ukraine as part of a deal on the Black Sea fleet and nuclear missile forces.

This is a generally popular record. The "near abroad" is seen to have created a host of new challenges to which Russia cannot respond passively. Foremost among these is the need to protect the position of Russian minorities now living beyond Russia?s borders, not least so as to prevent an unmanageable mass exodus back to Russia. Policies of all kinds--from creating the ruble zone to defending the Afghan border against Islamic fundamentalists--are explained in relation to this goal: giving Russians abroad the confidence they need to stay put. Foreign Minister Kozyrev?s description of government policy in dealing with the civil war in Tajikistan is applicable to many other issues as well: "We cannot afford to do nothing."

Yet there is a second side to policy toward the "near abroad" that is far more grudging and much less activist and prepared, given Russia?s troubles at home, to make sacrifices for what is now foreign policy. Reintegration is simply expensive. Almost all the policies that have been put in place to create "special relationships" with the former Soviet states are criticized as unaffordable. No sooner had agreement been reached on the ruble zone, for example, than senior Russian officials began to express doubts about its destabilizing impact on economic reforms. Russia, said Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin (now a leading member of Shakhrai?s "conservative" party), cannot afford to play wet nurse to poor neighbors. Russian negotiators quickly began to impose stricter conditions for monetary union, and the idea receded into the future. Money and patriotism were at odds; money won.