The Return of Russian History

Dimitri K. Simes

From Foreign Affairs, January/February 1994

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Summary:  In the latest Russian transitions lurk the potential for autocratic presidential rule and neo-imperialist foreign policy. Neither would serve Western interests and may not come to pass. But it would now be prudent for the United States to practice a patient, detached policy clearly based on its interests and not on the personal propensities of Boris Yeltsin. Discernment is called for. Traditional great power assertiveness should not be mistaken for a revival of the Russian imperial legacy.

Dimitri K. Simes is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

Is the Russian-Soviet evil empire coming back? Certainly not yet, but amidst the confusion, there is evidence of an evolution of Russian conduct on both domestic and international issues and the reemergence of some familiar and disturbing themes in Russian history. Taking into account Russia?s past and its enormous power--potential, if not actual--Western policymakers would be derelict of their duty to watch the new elements of autocracy and heavy-handedness in Moscow?s policies without serious concern. It would be equally dangerous, however, to overstate the case, to focus selectively on those contradictory developments that lend themselves to a more sinister interpretation of events. One thing is certain. The bloody demise of the Congress of People?s Deputies on October 4 and the election of the new Federal Assembly on December 12 have created a profoundly different political situation with serious implications for Russian foreign policy and U.S.-Russian relations.

SOMETHING HAD TO CHANGE

By the time of the October events, it was clear that something had to change. Toward the end of its existence, the Congress of People?s Deputies lost all credibility and sense of responsibility. Increasingly dominated by extremists, it saw its sole mission--except for enjoying the privileges of office--as going after President Boris Yeltsin and his government. It became an obstacle not only to reform, but to effective governance altogether.

Whether the well-known outcome of the stalemate was inevitable is another matter entirely. After all, this was the Congress that elected Yeltsin as its chairman, amended the Russian constitution to enable him to become president, and stood firmly at his side during the attempted coup d?état in August 1991. Most Russian commentators agree that if, in the aftermath of his victory against the junta, Yeltsin had asked the Congress to dissolve itself in order to clear the way for some kind of democratically elected constitutional assembly, the Congress probably would have complied.

At that juncture, Yeltsin had two sensible options. The first was to disband the Congress. It had been elected under the old Soviet system, was more conservative than the president himself and included a great many people who represented nonexistent organs of the Communist Party and Soviet government. The second was to try to develop a constructive partnership between the executive and the legislature. This would have required that Yeltsin make compromises, cut deals and share the responsibility for governance. Instead, Yeltsin opted to keep the Congress in place but to take its compliance for granted, as if he were a communist general secretary dealing with an old-style rubber-stamp Supreme Soviet. Yeltsin also supported the then aggressively loyal Ruslan Khasbulatov in his drive to become the speaker. The expectation was that Khasbulatov would exercise tight control over the parliament in the president?s name.

This arrangement worked for several months in the fall of 1991--the Congress even granted Yeltsin emergency authority to introduce economic reforms by decree. However, once the high societal costs of these reforms became apparent, the parliament?s subservient attitude changed ...

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