The Battle for Egypt

Stanley Reed

From Foreign Affairs, September/October 1993

Article preview: first 500 of 4,817 words total.

Summary:  The battle for Egypt is being played out between the pro-Western regime of Hosni Mubarak and Islamic militants who want to establish a fundamentalist government. The Islamicists are not strong enough now to seize power, but they could cripple Mubarak's ability to deal with economic and political challenges. If Egypt becomes unstable, by insurrections of militants or the military, U.S. aid to Egypt-nearly $35 billion since 1975-may be in danger of being swept away.

CAN MUBARAK SURVIVE?

Egypt's usual calm has been shattered. Nearly every day new incidents occur in the deadly struggle between the government of President Hosni Mubarak and Islamic militants known as the Gamaa al-Islamiya, or Islamic Group. The militants gun down policemen, ambush officials and hostile intellectuals, and terrorize tourists with bombs near the pyramids or the Karnak Temple. The government hits back with equal ferocity. Suspected extremists are rounded up by the score in bloody sweeps that have left many bystanders dead or wounded. This summer Mubarak began sending his antagonists to the gallows. Groups of six and seven men were hanged on single mornings. Such mass executions are rare and shocking in Egypt.

Mubarak is facing the most serious challenge since he took over the government following the assassination of Anwar Sadat in October 1981. The danger is not so much that the Gamaa will seize power. They lack the popular appeal and the talent to take over any time soon. But they could cripple Mubarak's ability to deal with economic and political challenges that are daunting enough without the added complication of an armed insurrection. The rebellion also leaves Mubarak vulnerable to criticism that he is partly to blame for the emergence of the militant Islamic groups. His critics take him to task for failing to promote sound economic growth; for tolerating corruption and growing social injustice; and for putting off political liberalization, thus giving frustrated youths nowhere to turn to except militant Islam.

In the coming months Mubarak's confrontation with the militants will strain the special relationship that has developed between the United States and Egypt since the Camp David process began in the mid-1970s. Indeed, there is already tension between the Egyptian government and its powerful benefactor. For the United States it is impossible not to compare the current situation in Egypt with the one that led to the disastrous fall of the shah of Iran in 1979. Once again a Middle Eastern country central to America is menaced by Islamic activists. Once again American policymakers ask whether the enormous political and economic capital that they have invested in Egypt, including $35 billion in aid since 1975, is in danger of being swept away. They also question whether Mubarak's leadership adds to the risk of failure.

AN ECONOMIST'S NIGHTMARE

Mubarak realizes that to snap Egypt out of its present malaise and decrease the appeal of Islamic fundamentalists, he must improve the economy's performance. He has taken the first step of committing himself to an ambitious restructuring of the economy, but he faces a herculean task. Years of avoiding the sort of structural reforms so many other countries have adopted have weakened the Egyptian economy. The economy stagnated during the 1980s, while external debt rose by nearly 150 percent, from $21 billion to $50 billion. In 1991, with arrears to foreign creditors mounting, Egypt was forced to agree to a reform program monitored by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In deference to ...

End of preview: first 500 of 4,817 words total.