The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent

John J. Mearsheimer

From Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993

Article preview: first 500 of 5,359 words total.

Summary:  Conventional wisdom argues that Ukraine should be forced to give up its nuclear weapons to ensure peace and stability in Europe. This is quite wrong. As soon as Ukraine declared its independence, Washington should have encouraged Kiev to fashion its own secure nuclear deterrent. The dangers of Russian-Ukrainian rivalry bode poorly for peace. If Ukraine is forced to maintain a large conventional army to deter potential Russian expansion, the danger of war is much greater than if it maintains a nuclear capability. U.S. policy should recognize that Ukraine, come what may, will keep its nuclear weapons.

THE LOGIC OF PROLIFERATION

Most Western observers want Ukraine to rid itself of nuclear weapons as quickly as possible. In this view, articulated recently by President Bill Clinton, Europe would be more stable if Russia were to become "the only nuclear-armed successor state to the Soviet Union." The United States and its European allies have been pressing Ukraine to transfer all of the nuclear weapons on its territory to the Russians, who naturally think this is an excellent idea.

President Clinton is wrong. The conventional wisdom about Ukraine's nuclear weapons is wrong. In fact, as soon as it declared independence, Ukraine should have been quietly encouraged to fashion its own nuclear deterrent. Even now, pressing Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state is a mistake.

A nuclear Ukraine makes sense for two reasons. First, it is imperative to maintain peace between Russia and Ukraine. That means ensuring that the Russians, who have a history of bad relations with Ukraine, do not move to reconquer it. Ukraine cannot defend itself against a nuclear-armed Russia with conventional weapons, and no state, including the United States, is going to extend to it a meaningful security guarantee. Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive.

Second, it is unlikely that Ukraine will transfer its remaining nuclear weapons to Russia, the state it fears most. The United States and its European allies can complain bitterly about this decision, but they are not in a position to force Ukraine to go nonnuclear. Moreover, pursuing a confrontation with Ukraine over the nuclear issue raises the risks of war by making the Russians more daring, the Ukrainians more fearful, and the Americans less able to defuse a crisis between them.

The case presented here for a Ukrainian nuclear deterrent is not a brief for unrestricted nuclear proliferation in Europe or anywhere else in the world. Nuclear proliferation does not axiomatically promote peace and can in some cases even cause war. For example, smaller European powers might lack the resources needed to make their nuclear force survivable, and vulnerable nuclear forces would invite a first strike in a crisis. Moreover, widespread proliferation would increase the number of fingers on the nuclear trigger, which in turn would increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons could be fired due to accident, unauthorized use, terrorist seizure or irrational decision-making.

Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation sometimes promotes peace. Overall, the best formula for maintaining stability in post-Cold War Europe is for all the great powers-including Germany and Ukraine--to have secure nuclear deterrents and for all the minor powers to be nonnuclear.

WHO CONTROLS THE WEAPONS?

The breakup of the Soviet Union left Ukraine with almost 4,000 nuclear weapons on its territory. Ukrainian leaders emphasized before and immediately after Ukraine declared its independence on December 1, 1991, that Ukraine would transfer all of its nuclear weapons to Russia by the end of 1994, sign the Nonproliferation ...

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