The Case for Pragmatism

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1991/92

Summary:  With the end of the Cold War, and of the concerns it involved, it is natural that US attention should turn to the solution of domestic and economic problems. It is exaggeration to read such a shift as "some form of isolationism".

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

On the other hand it is not axiomatic that the new Russian state will be antagonistic toward the United States. Washington may well have more in common with Moscow than with Tokyo or Beijing. It is in the American interest, however, that the western republics of the old U.S.S.R. be firmly tied to the European political and security system. A new pan-European organization may be necessary for this purpose.

VII

The case for pragmatism is also strong in Asia. America fought three wars in Asia, but fifty years after Pearl Harbor, and almost twenty years since Vietnam, America still cannot define its proper role there. The problems are the same as they have been for almost a century?our uneasy relations with Japan and China. Usually, we have managed to have good relations with one or the other, and recently with both. But currently our relations with both are in danger of deteriorating.

After World War II the situation in Asia remained dangerous and uncertain well into the 1970s. In this turmoil, to ally with Japan?a truly revolutionary change?became the bedrock of American security policy in Asia. As a result Japan has peacefully achieved its World War II aim of preeminence in Asia?except for a free hand in China. But the price has been to antagonize its principal protector, the United States. The alliance between Japan and the United States is turning sour, given the end of the Cold War, the growth of nationalism on both sides and the reality of their economic parity.

For the first time the disintegration of that alliance now appears possible, though not yet likely. Whereas the American alliance with Europe has deeper cultural and historical roots, the alliance with Japan has been more superficial and dictated by expediency on both sides. This poses major long-term uncertainty for American policy, perhaps of the most far-reaching and potentially dangerous sort. America does not need Japan, but neither does Japan need America (except perhaps against China). Nevertheless both sides should have an interest in putting this relationship on a new basis that can withstand the pressures and temptations of economic nationalism. It is difficult to believe that such an important relationship will founder on a trade deficit. Unfortunately, racism on both sides may prove to be the decisive factor. It already aggravates legitimate debates over trade and economics.

China is also a major uncertainty. It has been buffeted by the Cold War more than any other Asian country except Vietnam. During the Second World War, China was accorded great power status by both Roosevelt and Stalin. By 1950 China was at war with the United States, almost a pariah; a decade later it was virtually isolated, having broken with the Soviet Union. By the 1980s it had clearly returned to the ranks of the great powers. Indeed its vote in the Security Council was critical to the prosecution of the war against Saddam Hussein.

With the end of communism in the Soviet Union, however, China is far less valuable as an ally to the United States (except perhaps against Japan). On the other hand, the United States offers no protection for China against an infection of glasnost from Russia. The geopolitical arguments that favored close relations between Washington and Beijing are losing their force. In an era of democratization and liberalization, China remains an anomaly. Finally, it faces a change in its top leadership that is likely to have a profound impact. No one seems confident of any prediction about China?s future after the reign of the Long Marchers comes to its inevitable end.

Every so often it has seemed as if the United States were on the brink of a new era in Asia or the Pacific that would finally bring an end to the Eurocentrism in American foreign policy. This was a favorite theme during the Reagan years. But that seems less and less likely. The grim prospect is that both China and Japan are potential antagonists of the United States, though not enemies. Even that extreme case cannot be excluded, if Washington does not resist humiliating these proud nations with self-righteous demands for free trade with Tokyo and human rights in Beijing. Can we legitimately expect the leaders in either of these countries to overturn their social and economic orders to placate foreigners? In any case, to antagonize both Japan and China would be a grave geopolitical mistake.

VIII

The other area most affected by the end of the Cold War is the Middle East. Here, too, pragmatism rather than principle is beginning to govern the conduct of the parties involved in the conflict, as well as the United States, the only outside power of any consequence in this area.