The Case for Pragmatism

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1991/92

Summary:  With the end of the Cold War, and of the concerns it involved, it is natural that US attention should turn to the solution of domestic and economic problems. It is exaggeration to read such a shift as "some form of isolationism".

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

The United States will also have to provide political and psychological reassurances that Germany will not disrupt the European balance. Fortunately, the Bonn of the 1990s is not the Weimar of the 1920s. Unified Germany is embedded in a structure of alliances and institutions; its democracy has deeper roots, and its external ambitions and grievances have been satisfied. There is no "stab in the back" legend or any case for irredentism. Thus there is no reason for the United States to maintain large troop units in Germany as a pseudo-occupation force.

In sum, America can afford to disengage from the detailed management of the alliance, because in Europe there is still a solid coalition of friendly powers, favorably disposed toward the United States. "Let Europe be Europe" would not be a bad policy, provided it applies from the Atlantic to the Urals.

VI

Letting Russia be Russia, however, cannot be a sound policy. The United States cannot disengage very far from dealing with the new governments, because several of those entities in some form or other are still nuclear powers. This fact alone will involve the United States intimately in the formulation and conduct of policies of the larger new republics.

The most difficult aspect for Americans is to recognize that on most issues we are on the sidelines. What is happening in Russia is not a struggle over market economics, as many in the West believe, but the play of historical forces that have been at work for more than four centuries.

It is naïve to expect that what will emerge in this Eurasian land mass will be a collection of democratic, market-oriented and benign states. The new Commonwealth in Minsk is worthy of Potemkin. Most of the new republics are weak, have little basis for legitimate statehood, and some may not even survive. What is critical is the future of Russia and Ukraine, the only two states of any real consequence for the United States.

One can hope that Russia will break with its history and firmly implant the roots of democracy. But more likely is the eventual revival of an autocratic state, probably well armed and potentially hostile toward its neighbors.

The question is whether Russian dominance will be reasserted by force of arms or whether some condominium or accommodation will be reached between Ukraine and Russia. In any case, it is naive to believe that the successor states, including Ukraine, will give up all of their nuclear weapons to a well-armed Russia. It is also foolish to believe that out of chaos and crisis will come a well-ordered market. Russia is not Poland. Economic reform cannot be imposed by Russia on other independent republics. Whatever economic order emerges will be a hybrid, probably with a strong, centrally controlled state sector.

It may be years, if not decades, before Russia will know its fate. If there were ever a case for prudence and pragmatism, Russia is it. Pragmatism translates into restraint in rushing aid for this or that economic scheme or for this or that political leader, including Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Most of the money will be wasted, as it already has been. Long-term technical assistance makes sense, but only if it is clearly recognized that the payoff may not be evident for years, if ever. And it is doubtful that American opinion will sustain a long-term program in a period of economic difficulties at home.

Quarrels inside the former Soviet territory are almost certain to continue and perhaps worsen. They will have to be dealt with carefully in Washington. There will be a natural tendency to support Russia because it is the most powerful center. Moreover it is convenient to have a central point to deal with on various foreign policy issues. It is really not up to the United States, however, to be the arbiter between Russia and, say, Ukraine or the five Central Asian nations, or to become the champion of the new Commonwealth.