The Case for Pragmatism

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1991/92

Summary:  With the end of the Cold War, and of the concerns it involved, it is natural that US attention should turn to the solution of domestic and economic problems. It is exaggeration to read such a shift as "some form of isolationism".

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

?The United States has emerged from the Cold War in a precarious economic position. Just how precarious is open to debate, but there seems to be a consensus that America has to put its own economic house in order.

?The national mood is more xenophobic because of the recession; the Gulf War already led to demands that other countries bear their share of the burden of a new world order. For the first time in its history, America sought foreign aid to fight a war (a humiliation, but nevertheless consistent with American opinion). Moreover protectionism in trade has much greater support than at any time since the 1930s.

?The breakdown in Cold War alignments has led to three geopolitical changes that overshadow all others for the United States: the emergence of Germany, the liberation of eastern Europe and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. Few changes of such importance have occurred so quickly in peacetime.

?Power has devolved not only to the new economic giants, but to diverse areas and regions, as well as to new institutions. The gatherings of the Group of Seven industrialized nations are a more accurate reflection of contemporary power realities than, say, a NATO meeting or an East-West summit.

In sum and in paradox, the United States does not have anything approaching the freedom of action it enjoyed in the Cold War decades. In the Cold War, even though the lines were sharply drawn, the United States could choose to intervene or not, and much of the world deferred to Washington. Now the political lines are far less distinct, and allies that were almost totally dependent on Washington seek greater autonomy and, like the United States, are under domestic pressures to assert more nationalistic positions. Whereas anticommunism neutralized much dissent, even during the Vietnam War, the gulf crisis unleashed a ferocious political debate over the use of force.

The intricacies of the nuclear balance gave the president extraordinary powers. Even in the late 1980s the United States could pour billions into the Strategic Defense Initiative. That freedom for the chief executive ended in 1990 when the growing economic crisis forced the budget agreement to reduce the deficit. Finally, the United States cannot afford to support countries or ventures without regard to the economic consequences. The halcyon days of Marshall plans are long past.

All of this means that for some years the guiding force of American policy will not be ideology or high principles, but a far greater pragmatism. Policymakers will have to placate nationalistic sentiment at home and satisfy several overlapping centers of power abroad. On occasion there will have to be compromises on issues such as free trade, the crusade for democracy, human rights and the rule of law?the very principles of the new world order. Much like the policy of containment, a prolonged pragmatism may be necessary to finally realize those laudable goals.

None of this will be very heroic. No trumpets will call forth divisions under a banner of pragmatism and prudence. There is, moreover, the obvious danger that the means will devour the ends; steady doses of pragmatism and prudence could dilute the final goals that are sought in their name. But the trend toward greater pragmatism is already evident.

Consider, for example, Washington?s steadfast refusal to intervene in Yugoslavia. One may well ask what happened to defending independence and resisting aggression, the principles of Operation Desert Storm. Was it difficult to distinguish between Serbia?s aggression and Saddam Hussein?s? Do not Slovenia and Croatia have a much better claim to independence and recognition than such synthetic states as Kazakhstan and Kirghizia?

Consider Haiti. Surely this was a prime case for vigorous American intervention to restore democracy; do not the long-suffering Haitians deserve U.S. support at least as much as the Kuwaitis?