The Case for Pragmatism

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1991/92

Summary:  With the end of the Cold War, and of the concerns it involved, it is natural that US attention should turn to the solution of domestic and economic problems. It is exaggeration to read such a shift as "some form of isolationism".

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

The isolationism versus internationalism debate is in reality the debate among the various types of internationalism; that which aims frankly to serve the national interest, as conventionally conceived (to protect its territory, wealth and access to necessary goods; to defend its nationals); that which aims to preserve and defend democracy; and a brand of ?disinterested globalism? which looks at the world and asks what needs to be done?with little explicit concern for the national interest.

III

There is a missing element in this debate: an understanding that the current historical period is transitional. This time the cliché is true: this is a new era, but we are only in the opening phases. It is fruitless to search for a politically correct concept of the national interest to justify American foreign policy. Debating in these categories is itself an intellectual hangover from the Cold War.

All of the protagonists?isolationist, internationalist or realist?are quick to prescribe policies but reluctant to analyze the new circumstances. The character and structure of world politics has already been radically altered. It will take years for the consequences to be absorbed. Take the situation inside the former Soviet Union: the turmoil there makes this a period of transition almost by definition. It will be a decade before European unity is completed, even in its narrowest terms. The U.S. defense posture is only in the preliminary stages of the restructuring that will follow the end of the Soviet threat. And the likelihood is that America will suffer large budget deficits for years. The strongest new force is nationalism. It is rising everywhere, manifesting itself as Islamic fundamentalism, as regionalism, as economic protectionism, in ethnic conflict and revolutionary upheavals.

This transitional phase may last a decade before the outlines of a new world order emerge, and when that happens it will probably be more by trial and error than by design. No overriding principle articulated in advance will be sufficient to handle the burgeoning diversity of the new international agenda. If the choices are only among various concepts of realism, the operational question still remains: For what objectives ought the United States use its still awesome power? No one is arguing that we should not use that power at all, but there is growing debate over both means and ends.

It may well be that no major decisions can be made until after the presidential election. These contests have never been conducive to an orderly discussion about foreign policy, nor are foreign policy matters likely to be the pivotal issues in this campaign (except perhaps for the endless reruns of the congressional debate and vote on the Gulf War). If the 1992 election is not likely to determine the direction of a new foreign policy, the winner will nevertheless have to deal with a world that is already radically different from the campaign of 1988.

IV

For some time it has been obvious that the bipolar division of international politics has ended. The immediate consequence is that many countries, areas and issues that might have seemed vital to American security in the contest with the Soviet Union have suddenly lost their attraction and urgency (the Horn of Africa is a prime example).

Some argue that the end of bipolarity means the emergence of unipolarity, that is, the dominance of the United States in reordering the world as it chooses, and in its own image. They cite the Gulf War as proof: only the United States could have organized the coalition and prosecuted the war. Others cite the Gulf War to reach an opposite conclusion: that the United States could organize the coalition only through the cooperation of a diverse collection of powers. The war, thus, inaugurated not American dominance but a new era of international cooperation.

While it is true that the United States remains the only genuine superpower, this is tempered by several factors: