America's Missed Opportunities

David Gergen

From Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1991/92

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Summary:  The recession threatens to poison US foreign relations. The Bush administration failed to capitalize on the momentum of the Gulf War and Cold War victories, and proved "far more adept at cleaning up the debris of an old world than building the framework of the new". "Unless the nation embarks upon a comprehensive program of domestic renewal, the United States within a few years could become so deeply mired in its own troubles that its politics will turn even more embittered, xenophobic and inward. The specter of neo-isolationism that raised its head in late 1991 will then be but a precursor of worse to come, as reluctance to act as a leader turns into outright refusal, and international politics becomes a bare-knuckled brawl".

David Gergen is Editor at Large of U.S. News & World Report.

A year ago America stood astride the world. Its troops were poised to lead an international coalition against Saddam Hussein, its president showed greater mastery over foreign affairs than any chief executive since Franklin D. Roosevelt and its prestige was soaring. In every quarter other nations acknowledged that the United States had emerged from the Cold War as the only functioning superpower and that the ideas it espoused were increasingly triumphant. An influential American columnist, Charles Krauthammer, wrote a year ago in this journal that a unipolar moment had arrived and that a confident United States should learn to accept its new role, aggressively imposing its own vision.

What a difference a recession makes. Few outside the White House talk anymore of creating a "new world order," unless in jest. The United States cannot achieve order in its streets or even in its capital, much less in the rest of the world. Staggered by an economic downturn that has taken a deeper psychological toll than expected and frustrated by a paralysis in its politics, the United States toward the end of 1991 turned increasingly pessimistic, inward and nationalistic. Its secretary of state could still bring recalcitrant leaders from the Middle East into face-to-face conversations, but its president had so much trouble corralling the leaders of his nation?s political parties that he began wobbling in foreign policy. From the campaign trail politicians who were misreading the public mood?and who also knew better?began whipping up the winds of a new isolationism. Insistent cries came along that the nation should embrace a new philosophy of putting America first: turn a hard, flinty eye toward economic competitors, said its advocates, and curtail the long tradition of generous idealism in foreign policy. As troubles spread in America, other powers began edging away from its orbit. In Japan the press was intrigued by the sudden popularity of kenbei?a feeling of condescension toward America?while in Europe leaders gathered in Maastricht without thinking twice about any interest the United States might have in their deliberations.

In a world where the outlook changes as often as the weather the question arises whether we shall ever again see a replay of early 1991, America the ascendant, or if that was the last gasp of a great nation visibly and sourly slipping? Will the United States during the 1990s still seek to build a new international regime, or will it slink away into a new isolationism? Will it remain an agent of openness and change, or will it close both its wallet and its borders?

No one can be certain, of course, but there were enough clues in the months leading up to the Persian Gulf crisis and afterwards to suggest that with the Cold War?s end, domestic politics will become a much more significant factor in the formation of foreign policy and will increasingly drive the United States toward a new world role that fits neither extreme. When the recession is over tempers presumably will improve, and Americans will ...

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