America's New Course

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Spring 1990

Summary:  Analysis of the USA's post-Cold War security interests, seeing a decline in military and ideological issues, and growth of interest in trade and economic policy, the environment, terrorism and drug trafficking. FA editor.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

The trade deficit, on the other hand, is linked to the issue of the increasing economic power of Japan. Efforts to correct the American trade imbalance have badly eroded Washington's political relationship with Tokyo. Each new technical issue is escalated into a political challenge. One observer, former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Alan Wolff, has said that "for the first time in at least two decades, you have open hostility between those on either side of the trade debate." The danger is that what began as a squabble over trade is degenerating into a more fundamental conflict with important geopolitical consequences. Thus, prominent Japanese accuse the United States of outright racism, and important elements of American opinion increasingly view Japan as a hostile force.13 Public opinion polls taken among Americans show a souring of attitude consisting of two factors: resentment over Japanese investment in high-profile areas (e.g., Rockefeller Center in New York), and a fear that too great a dependence on foreign sources will make the United States vulnerable to political and financial blackmail.

The strategic issue is whether the United States intends to continue anchoring its policy to the alliance with Japan. If not, what are the alternatives? If so, a reappraisal of trade and other aspects of the relationship is urgently necessary on both sides to avoid a collision.

The economic component of national security shows up in other areas as well. The strain on resources affects policy for the western hemisphere because of the huge debts incurred by key Latin American countries. One of the immediate aims of the Treasury Department's current "Brady Plan" is to reduce these debts rather than defer or restructure them. Thus far the results have been mixed at best. Important Latin American countries have not even joined the process. A failure of this plan risks a backlash among U.S. investors against making any new foreign investments or loans, i.e., a creeping tendency toward American economic autarky at the very moment that Latin America has made its greatest progress toward democracy, and at the moment when new demands on public and private resources for Panama, and probably Nicaragua, are required.14

There is also the prospect of increasing energy costs over the next decade; rising oil prices and increasing American dependence on foreign oil sources could add billions to the U.S. balance-of-payments deficit. Such an increased dependency on oil from the Persian Gulf could have a renewed impact on U.S. policy in the Middle East, on attitudes toward Israel and on questions of arms sales to friendly Arab countries.

Finally, the United States finds that its resources are almost certainly too limited to allow it to play the major role expected of it in other areas, especially in Eastern Europe. That region's nations are likely to turn to Germany and the European Community for support, thus magnifying the loss of American influence.

In fashioning a response to these various economic difficulties the United States will be reconstructing, whether deliberately or not, its foreign and defense policies. To what extent will the United States be willing to make economic sacrifices and concessions to further its political goals? Alternatively, how willing will we be to allow such responsibilities to devolve onto others, with a corresponding reduction in American influence in broad areas of the world?

V

Not all of the Cold War's issues have been solved by any means. There is a residue of important issues that will remain at the center of American policy for the next several years.

In the postwar era the United States and its allies constructed a political, military and economic system based on the strategic assumption that the confrontation with the Soviet Union would continue indefinitely. Active policy planning for a post-Cold War era ceased long ago-if, indeed, it ever got started.15 The stationing of large American forces in Europe, as well as in South Korea, Japan and the Philippines, assumed a protracted conflict. The same rationale applied, in varying degrees, to American commitments to Iran and the Persian Gulf, to Pakistan and to friends in the Middle East. Even the commitment to Israel, which has had a strong moral dimension, was sharply enhanced by the Soviet intervention in support of Nasser in 1955-56. Although the American presence in many areas was originally conceived as a riposte to Soviet thrusts and as a deterrent, these commitments seem to have gradually taken on an added significance as an element of regional stability and reassurance. Indeed, the American military presence in Europe was recently justified by President Bush in the name of "stability" and "predictability."

As the Cold War ends, the United States confronts an obvious question: Can or should America's commitments and presence abroad be reduced, in response to the decline in the threat to U.S. interests and the limitations on American resources, without risking a destabilization of the very areas in which the United States wishes to remain involved?