East-West Relations

Valery Giscard d'Estaing, Yashuhiro Nakasone, Henry A. Kissinger

From Foreign Affairs, Summer 1989

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Summary:  The West must change its grand strategy in the face of changing Soviet presence in the world order. "Passivity or -- worse -- a posture of delayed and uncoordinated reaction to Soviet initiatives would enable the Kremlin to define the East-West agenda and serve primarily Soviet interests". Soviet reformism is driven by a sense of approaching crisis, and is ready to accept fundamental changes in domestic and foreign policy. Nevertheless, the USSR will maintain the contest with the USA where it can: "certain aspects of current Soviet policy, especially in Europe, are consistent with this long-term objective". The democracies must learn to cope with the Soviet flurry of unilateral initiatives, and to sift the genuine concessions from the propaganda. Reviews the issues in (1) strategic arms control, recommending a greater attention to linkage with larger security policy goals (2) the future of Eastern Europe, recommending the devising of "a category of association with the European Community based on article 238 of the Treaty of Rome" (3) the nature, extent and timing of the economic aid which might be extended to the USSR to promote desirable reform (4) encouraging an acceptable Soviet policy towards the Asia-Pacific region (5) human rights. Predicts that "the competitive relationship between East and West will not disappear... an overall reconciliation of conflicting interests is still a long-term objective". Sets out various 'checkpoints' for assessing Western progress in achieving a more conciliatory foreign policy in these areas. This portrayal of Soviet state action and interests by three top-flight statesmen of the non-communist world, is one of organic and well-integrated policy, carefully calculated to retain maximum advantage in an adverse strategic situation. It shows no anticipation of internal instability, even as late as mid-1989. Those political scientists anguished at the 'failure' of their discipline to anticipate the Soviet collapse can draw some comfort from this equally miserable performance.

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing is a Member of the National Assembly and Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, and is a former President of the French Republic. Yasuhiro Nakasone is a Member of the Diet and a former Prime Minister of Japan. Henry A. Kissinger is a former U.S. Secretary of State. This article is adapted from a report to The Trilateral Commission, to be published as Triangle Paper No. 36. Copyright (c) 1989 by The Trilateral Commission.

East-West relations have entered a new phase. Changes in the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policies have already affected the climate of East-West relations and, in some areas, its substance. Mikhail Gorbachev's new policies suggest new approaches to the future of the Soviet Union's domestic system, its foreign policies, and East-West relations. It would be a mistake, however, to analyze these developments or to devise Western policies in terms of a single personality; to be lasting they must take into account the fundamental necessities facing the Soviet Union and the opportunities before the democracies.

We have prepared this report in the belief that our countries face a challenge that will shape the future of international relations for several decades. So far, our countries have not reached a consensus on the significance of this challenge, on the degree to which it reflects a lasting change in Soviet policies, or even on our own attitudes in relation to it.

Some believe that, until much more has changed in the Soviet Union, the industrial democracies should wait prudently on the sidelines or continue the same general policies they have pursued since World War II. Others argue that the Soviet threat has changed so completely that the existing defense and political arrangements can be dramatically altered.

Based on our collective experience of dealing with the Communist world, discussions with present Soviet leaders including Mr. Gorbachev, and studies by experts in the West, we believe that our countries have a rare opportunity to change the nature of East-West relations in ways beneficial to the West, provided they develop a clear agenda and strategy. On the other hand, passivity or-worse-a posture of delayed and uncoordinated reaction to Soviet initiatives would enable the Kremlin to define the East-West agenda and serve primarily Soviet interests.

Few would contest that our countries have a profound stake in developments inside the Soviet Union. For more than four decades, protecting our national security and the freedom of other peoples from Soviet expansionism has placed a tremendous burden on our countries and occasionally on our relationships with each other. During this period we have had to live with the threat of devastating conflict. We take pride in the fact that defenses have been maintained and military conflict deterred.

We do not expect to reduce these burdens substantially overnight. Mr. Gorbachev cannot wish away the fundamental differences in systems, outlooks and interests that have separated the Soviet bloc from the non-Communist world. Nor should our leaders expect this. Change will come slowly and ambivalently. In the meantime, our countries will have to remain strong and vigilant. A successful transformation to a more peaceful East-West relationship is not guaranteed. New foundations for East-West relations, if they are to be solid, must be built arduously-brick by brick.

SOVIET TRENDS

Our assessment of the Soviet Union is based on two premises. First, the pressures for change in Soviet domestic and foreign policies reflect a crisis of the Communist system and not simply the personal preferences ...

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