Struggle for Southern Africa

Robert G. Mugabe

From Foreign Affairs, Winter 1987/88

Summary:  The Republic of South Africa is both engaging in a 'vicious and ugly' civil war and 'waging an undeclared war against its neighbours'. After reviewing RSA intervention in Mozambique and Angola, and arguing that the front-line states are opposed to apartheid, not to whites or to Western interests, calls for US policy-makers to match words with deeds, namely by backing a policy of economic sanctions. Then prime minister, now president of Zimbabwe.

Robert G. Mugabe is Prime Minister of the Republic of Zimbabwe, and currently chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement.

The Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the U.S. Congress a year ago was just such a signal. It banned the importation of South African coal, uranium, iron and steel, agricultural produce, textiles and krugerrands, and prohibited new U.S. loans, investments, credits and the sale of computer technology to the South African government and its agencies. It also terminated landing rights for South African Airways. Unfortunately, the thrust of the Anti-Apartheid Act has been blunted and watered down by the Pressler Amendment to the 1987 Appropriations Bill. As noted, the effect of this amendment is to deny financial resources to selected Frontline States, thereby making it difficult for them to participate in the sanctions program against South Africa.

Despite its pleading to the contrary, the United States has considerable leverage which has never been used, and sanctions are only part of this. It is the superpower to whom South Africa looks as an ally; it is a major trading partner and a member of many international organizations. There are material pressures which have never been used, or in some cases not enforced, in political, economic, cultural and military areas. It is true that only 200 U.S. corporations have, or had, direct investments in South Africa but these corporations wield considerable influence in Washington. If they are serious in their attempts to divest and distance themselves from apartheid, they must also use their political clout at home to bring apartheid to an end as quickly as possible.

The Commonwealth has been active in the international campaign to end apartheid, both in imposing its own limited sanctions and earlier leading the way in promulgating the international arms embargo.

Sanctions relating to military, economic, cultural and sporting activities isolate the regime; they are one method of raising the cost of apartheid both economically and psychologically. South Africa has been taking serious steps for a decade to prepare for this eventuality and to minimize the effect on the economy and the military machine. However, that is no reason to exclude sanctions from the list of pressure points, nor is the excuse that sanctions will destroy the economy.

The opponents of sanctions say, in the first place, that such measures will hurt the blacks in South Africa the most. This is a spurious argument. In South Africa, the black response has been clear and categorical: if sanctions will play a part in terminating the suffering, they must be imposed. The Anglican archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, has put this point most eloquently:

For goodness sake, let people not use us as an alibi for not doing the things they know they ought to. We are suffering now, and this kind of suffering seems to be going on and on and on. If additional suffering is going to put a terminus to our suffering then we will accept it.

A second argument is that sanctions against South Africa will hurt the neighboring majority-ruled states. But we are already suffering, as I have clearly illustrated earlier, and if additional suffering is necessary, we are also ready to pay the price. For several months the Frontline States consulted each other on whether to impose the Commonwealth package of sanctions, which was agreed upon at the Bahamas summit. It became clear that some Frontline States are not able to impose sanctions because their economies are tied into the South African economy like Siamese twins. This is true of those countries in the South African Customs Union as well as others. But although unable to do so themselves they urge those who can?especially the big powers?to adopt sanctions.

A third excuse used to argue against sanctions is that they do not work, the case of Rhodesia being cited as an example. But no single government, not even South Africa, could give formal recognition to the Rhodesian regime as long as it remained the target of comprehensive U.N.-sponsored mandatory economic sanctions. They worked in limited, but important and costly ways. Rhodesia was forced to sell its products at below-market prices and buy its imports at a premium.

VII

The time for easy and comfortable choices in South Africa has run out.