Reagan-Gorbachev III

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987

Summary:  Written in anticipation of the third summit and the signing of the INF treaty, concludes that Gorbachev has adopted a basically defensive strategy and seems prepared to settle for a prolonged stalemate in terms of strategic superiority to the USA. This leads him to seek arms control agreements as a means of codifying his assumptions about security and the nuclear relationship. Washington's policy of selective containment is balanced by Moscow's policy of selective commitment.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

Whether in arms control or regional negotiations, a serious American diplomacy will finally have to decide how to define and deal with legitimate Soviet interests, and how to gain public support for a policy that inevitably involves some American concessions to these interests. Does the Soviet Union have a right to strategic parity, or is this too dangerous a state of affairs for the United States? What is the legitimate security interest of the Soviet Union in the areas on its periphery: in Eastern Europe, Afghanistan, China? Does it have an implicit right of intervention in its sphere of influence? If so, does it include intervention with armed forces? Can the United States tolerate such a permanent threat to peace? What of the link between the nature of the internal Soviet regime, which will never be acceptable to the United States, and the content of Soviet foreign policy? Can the two be separated?

These are not academic questions. They remain at the heart of Soviet-American relations.

A viable Soviet-American relationship demands agreements, or at least some process to control nuclear arms and to resolve regional conflicts. The effort to achieve these two aims is bound to be protracted, and will involve reconciling contradictions and finely tuning tactics and strategy. A policy that requires such a consistent and careful management in a democratic society is not doomed to fail, but it is extraordinarily difficult to carry out. Above all, it will have to command the depth of public support necessary to sustain the policy when challenged in the next crisis.