Reagan-Gorbachev III

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987

Summary:  Written in anticipation of the third summit and the signing of the INF treaty, concludes that Gorbachev has adopted a basically defensive strategy and seems prepared to settle for a prolonged stalemate in terms of strategic superiority to the USA. This leads him to seek arms control agreements as a means of codifying his assumptions about security and the nuclear relationship. Washington's policy of selective containment is balanced by Moscow's policy of selective commitment.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

Under Gorbachev the Soviet Union is likely to be more prudent in the risks and responsibilities it undertakes in the Third World. This reflects a new and more modest evaluation of the prospects for the Soviet Union. It also suggests that Gorbachev does not accept the proposition that the contest with the West can be decided in the Third World. Indeed, he apparently believes the effort to gain a clear victory is too burdensome for the potential risks and gains.

Gorbachev seems to recognize that the Soviet Union?s global position has weakened over the last decade. The Soviet state is now forced to play the role of a more conventional world power. It no longer leads a revolution, it no longer offers ideological inspiration to the world, it no longer poses as the model for economic development.

Moscow is still the master of an East European empire, but another of those empires that is decaying from the virus of diversity and democracy. Champions of a universalist doctrine are poor imperialists?precisely because empires tend to find them wanting. The British had the wit to devise the Commonwealth; the Soviets have only the threat of intervention. The rise of Solidarity in Poland was a watershed for the Soviet empire; its further decline is only a matter of time. In this sense the lands behind the old Iron Curtain have become the new Sick Man of Europe, where the danger of a future war may be greatest.

It is possible to see in Gorbachev?s changes nothing more than shifts in tactics. It can even be argued that the wily old Gromyko would have arrived at similar conclusions about the position of the Soviet Union, but without resorting to Gorbachev?s novel rhetoric. A more persuasive analysis, however, is that Gorbachev views foreign policy in much the same way he sees his domestic situation. That is, he still believes in the basic system but recognizes that radical changes are in order, and that this will involve paying a price in the near term to achieve longer-term aims. Thus he is introducing innovative elements into current Soviet foreign policies which are beginning to outweigh the elements of continuity.

In sum, the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev to the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union marks the beginning of a new historical period. The transition from Brezhnev to Gorbachev is a genuine generational change, unlike the transfer of power from Khrushchev to Brezhnev in 1964. Gorbachev is the first post-revolutionary Soviet leader; he was born 14 years after the October Revolution. Indeed, he is a postwar leader?he was only ten at the time of Hitler?s invasion. But as the product and inheritor of a huge bureaucratic system, Gorbachev?s freedom of action is limited. The Soviet system can be reformed, but not drastically or quickly. Yet the domestic crisis in the Soviet Union cries out for just that?radical and urgent change.

This is Gorbachev?s dilemma. His only hope of pulling the Soviet Union out of the stagnation of the Brezhnev era is to strike hard at the system and continue the pressures for change. This is producing opposition at all levels, even in the Politburo, and thus his strategy puts his political survival at risk. He has even acknowledged this, but he will probably persist with his reform program. At some point, say within the next two to four years, he will probably face an internal crisis. If he prevails, he may well change the Soviet Union profoundly; if he fails, he may lose power. If he senses that he is failing and struggles to survive, it could be a dangerous period for the United States, as the temptation to compensate for internal failures with foreign adventures may prove irresistible.

The Soviet Union will not simply acquiesce in the disintegration of its world power position. Gorbachev was not enthroned to preside over the dismantling of the Soviet empire. Quite the contrary: many observers already detect a revival of Russian nationalism, which also poses dangers for the states on the periphery of the Soviet state. A nationalist policy might seek greater influence, even physical domination.

Even though the global position of the Soviet Union has weakened, a revival under Gorbachev is quite possible, albeit probably not in the near term. In any case, Gorbachev will give priority to domestic policy; his clear preference is to buy some time in foreign policy. Thus the overall combination of circumstances suggests that it is a time of unusual opportunity for American policy.

Whatever the outcome of a third Gorbachev-Reagan round of summitry, Gorbachev represents a force for change in the Soviet Union. But it is important to note that the struggle between the two superpowers has also been changing?quite significantly?since the Afghan invasion. The changes have affected the nuclear as well as the political relationship.

III