Reagan-Gorbachev III

William G. Hyland

From Foreign Affairs, Fall 1987

Summary:  Written in anticipation of the third summit and the signing of the INF treaty, concludes that Gorbachev has adopted a basically defensive strategy and seems prepared to settle for a prolonged stalemate in terms of strategic superiority to the USA. This leads him to seek arms control agreements as a means of codifying his assumptions about security and the nuclear relationship. Washington's policy of selective containment is balanced by Moscow's policy of selective commitment.

William G. Hyland is Editor of Foreign Affairs.

Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev seem to be moving warily toward their third meeting. Both leaders have an incentive for another summit: they both face major internal problems, and both need a visible success in foreign policy. Even though their motives differ, the two leaders have a common interest in keeping the arms control process alive. Yet they approach another summit from quite different positions. Gorbachev is still in the early phase of what may be an extended period of power as the Soviet leader. President Reagan is looking toward the end of his tenure. Unlike Reykjavik, this summit is being prepared slowly, with considerable maneuvering over the likely centerpiece?an arms control agreement eliminating intermediate-range ballistic missiles as well as cruise missiles in Europe and the U.S.S.R.

When the Reagan Administration took office, the outlook for East-West relations was gloomy in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It would have seemed fantastic to foresee three summit meetings and an important arms control agreement. Seven years ago, the era of détente was at an end, and there were major uncertainties as to what might follow. Many feared a new series of confrontations, a breakdown of arms control and an intensification of strategic arms competition. In the early 1980s American policy seemed geared to these expectations.

Despite such apprehensions, Soviet policy was increasingly constrained in this period. Moscow was generally passive in a series of regional crises, and was unable to block the deployment of American missiles in Europe. By late 1984, rather than confronting the Reagan Administration, Moscow was seeking to negotiate with it on arms control. Although this Soviet turnabout preceded Gorbachev, it was the new Soviet leader who exploited it vigorously, agreeing not only to the first get-acquainted summit in Geneva, but hustling for the second encounter at Reykjavik.

The beginning of the Gorbachev regime coincided with the high tide of the Reagan Administration. By 1984-85 much of the original Reagan defense program had been achieved. The Soviets had been brought back to the negotiating table under conditions favorable to the United States. The Administration could and did claim that it engaged in East-West diplomacy from a position of strength. In this light the Geneva summit of November 1985 was interpreted as a vindication of Administration policy.

After this first meeting, however, relations did not take a turn for the better. The deadlock that had been implicit in the two sides? arms control positions, especially over the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), became explicit at Reykjavik. What had appeared to be a strategic opportunity for a superpower breakthrough suddenly looked doubtful. For a time after Reykjavik it seemed that the Kremlin might decide to wait out the Reagan Administration. But then, in February 1987, Gorbachev took the initiative to revive the arms control negotiations. By midyear the near-term prospects for Soviet-American relations had improved.

II

Soviet policy has been relatively constrained during President Reagan?s years in office?in part because of the prolonged leadership crisis in the Kremlin. Almost four years passed between the final year of Brezhnev?s tenure and Gorbachev?s accession to office in March 1985. This period was also marked by crises for Moscow: in Afghanistan the war escalated, and in Poland the very essence of communist power?the party?s supremacy?was severely challenged. Soviet economic troubles worsened, and Soviet society was suffering from a widespread malaise, as Gorbachev now acknowledges.

This combination of factors led to an assumption in the West that Gorbachev would pursue a conciliatory foreign policy to gain time to concentrate on his internal problems. After taking office he suggested as much himself in various public statements and interviews. The reorganization of his foreign policy/national security apparatus also suggested that he would conduct a more sophisticated policy. A new flexibility seemed confirmed by a loosening of several Soviet positions toward China, Japan, Western Europe, Israel, and, eventually, the United States. Much of the change was stylistic. But some observers detected in the "new thinking" the seeds of more significant changes, especially regarding the nature of East-West security and the extent of Soviet involvement in the Third World.

Gorbachev has adopted a basically defensive strategy, rather than the aggressive one feared in 1980, but his tactics include a number of interesting innovations and initiatives. He is making a determined bid to establish a major Soviet presence in the Persian Gulf, where he aspires to be an honest broker between Iran and Iraq. His main effort is to reduce the "encirclement" of the Soviet Union by developing openings to the regions on its periphery, especially China and Japan. Unlike his predecessors, he is apparently prepared to make some concessions to both countries, including a withdrawal of some Soviet troops along the Chinese border.

Gorbachev has apparently concluded that the quest for genuine strategic superiority over the United States is futile and, consequently, he appears ready to settle for a prolonged strategic stalemate. But in the process he must be able to guarantee that the United States accepts the same premises; and this leads him to arms control agreements as a means for codifying his assumptions about security and the nuclear relationship. Of course Gorbachev also assumes that in the process of working out a new superpower relationship he can cause or encourage the retraction of the American presence in Europe, and perhaps in Asia as well. Here, too, he has offered concessions (e.g., the zero option, eliminating all of the SS-20 missiles from the Soviet force).