Farewell to Arms Control

Joseph S. Nye, Jr.

From Foreign Affairs, Fall 1986

Article preview: first 500 of 7,415 words total.

Summary:  Failure on the part of the superpowers to negotiate on strategic nuclear weapons could bring about the end of arms control as a tool of international politics. Various technical and political problems with 'deep cuts' are outlined, and cuts of between 25% and 30% are advocated as sufficient to allay public concern, but not so great as to put deterrence in jeopardy. Internal debate on SDI should not hinder this process.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is Director of the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University and author of Nuclear Ethics.

The United States and the Soviet Union have resumed negotiations for another summit meeting. In contrast to the first encounter between President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev, if this meeting takes place it will be difficult to avoid the specific issues of strategic arms control. Both sides have recently advanced new proposals. At the same time, however, the United States has distanced itself from the second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks treaty, which expired at the end of 1985. Thus, failure to make progress at the summit, or in the Geneva talks, could leave the two sides without any agreed framework for strategic arms control, except for the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which would then be in jeopardy.

President Reagan raised a political furor last May when he announced his intention to cease observing the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty. Congressional critics passed resolutions of disapproval and allies sent messages of alarm. They and other critics feared the decision meant the effective end of arms control. Whether the SALT decision will prove to be a major turning point away from arms control, the prelude to a new framework or a minor episode in domestic politics is highly uncertain. Even if it proves to be a turning point, there is disagreement on whether that will be good or bad for U.S. security.

Some strategists, inside and outside the Reagan Administration, consider not only SALT but the whole concept of formal arms control negotiations to be an obsolete remnant of the 1970s. They believe that arms control has diverted attention and distorted priorities in the U.S. defense program. In order to analyze the problems and potential of the President?s decision, we need first to understand how we got to the current situation.

II

It is ironic that it took the President nearly six years to disavow an unratified treaty that he had called "fatally flawed" and that, in any case, had expired in December 1985. Was SALT II so important? During the 1979 debates over its ratification, even its proponents pointed to its "modest" nature and the fact that it would not interfere with any significant program to modernize U.S. forces. Critics argued that the treaty was unequal because it did not cut Soviet heavy missiles, and the modest (ten percent) reductions did not do much to enhance U.S. security. As President Reagan put it last May, "the most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions."

How could such a modest treaty last so long? One reason, given by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1979, was that the treaty added predictability to the strategic competition which, in turn, enhanced defense planning. Moreover, even modest limits on Soviet forces looked better than any short-term alternatives. Without the treaty?s restraints, the Soviets could add even more delivery systems and warheads. In 1986, defenders of the treaty could still make the same argument. With active missile production lines and underutilized throw-weight on their heavy intercontinental ballistic ...

End of preview: first 500 of 7,415 words total.